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ABSTRACT
Motivated by recent attention given to the independent 
auditor's role in detecting red flags, this dissertation 
investigates the effect of time pressure on auditors' 
attention to red flags in the auditing environment. In so 
doing, the earlier work of McDaniel [1990] investigating the 
effects of time pressure on the auditor's ability to execute 
auditing tests of details is extended. Authoritative sources 
indicating that red flag detection is performed as a
subsidiary task in a multi-task auditing environment are 
presented. The Easterbrook hypothesis, which holds that a 
progressive reduction in the range of cue utilization
accompanies increases in arousal, provides theoretical support 
for the prediction that under time pressure auditors' 
attention will become more focused on the primary task of
executing auditing tests of details at the expense of
attention given to the subsidiary task of red flag detection.
McDaniel's [1990] test instrument was modified by seeding 
red flags within the text and data associated with a 
hypothetical audit client. This instrument was administered 
to practicing independent auditors at varying levels of time 
pressure. Results consistent with the theoretical
expectations are presented. The results suggest that auditors 
under high time pressure may be less likely to attend to and 
understand red flags than auditors under low time pressure.
ix
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Furthermore, the results suggest that the performance 
decrements associated with the red flag detection task may be 
observed at a lower level of time pressure than decrements in 
the accuracy with which auditing tests of details are 
executed.
x
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect 
of time pressure on the cognitive processes of auditors. 
Specifically, this dissertation compares the extent to which 
auditors under differing conditions of time pressure are able 
to attend to red flags1 while executing detailed tests related 
to a client's inventory system. The belief that auditors have 
a responsibility for detecting and investigating red flags 
that they are not meeting motivates this research. [National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p. 25]
Building upon McDaniel [1990], a study that demonstrated 
the effects of time pressure on the execution of audit tests
1 The term "red flags" is a colloquialism which refers 
to what auditing standards call "factors influencing audit 
risk." [AICPA 1992, AU 316.09] In the absence of a formal 
definition of the term, there is some variability in its 
application and interpretation. Conditions within an entity 
which allow irregularities to occur, factors which motivate 
individuals to commit irregularities, and attitudes or ethical 
standards which may predispose individuals to engage in 
irregularities are generally recognized classifications of red 
flags. Indicators present in accounting data such as unusual 
trends, sizes or relationships between amounts may also be red 
flags. The presence of a red flag does not necessarily mean 
that a financial fraud has occurred. It simply means that the 
characteristic has appeared in post-mortems of known financial 
frauds and should be treated with skepticism. Failure to 
detect a red flag is not necessarily the same thing as a 
failure to detect a fraud. If no fraud is present, one would 
not necessarily expect an auditor to comment on the presence 
of a red flag. This study addresses the ability of auditors 
to detect and investigate red flags in an audit setting in 
which the presence of several red flags, when considered in 
aggregate, indicates that there is a high probability that 
financial fraud is present.
1
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2
of details in a single-task setting, the proposed research 
examines time pressure's effects on both the primary cognitive 
task of executing detailed audit tests and the subsidiary 
cognitive task of being attentive to the red flags. This 
research demonstrates that the task of attending to red flags 
is, to a large extent, executed in such a dual cognitive task2 
environment. Throughout, I rely upon research in psychology 
to explain and predict the effects of time pressure on auditor 
performance. Results are, on the whole, supportive of the 
predictions made.
Overview
Auditors are engaged to render opinions on financial 
statements taken as a whole, and they do so through gathering 
sufficient, competent evidential matter that bears upon the 
reasonableness of managerial assertions contained within those 
statements. Such reasonableness is understood as, primarily, 
the absence of material misstatement of the financial 
statements taken as a whole.
Two corollaries of this overriding objective, the 
rendering of an opinion, are: (1) the possible discovery of 
errors, irregularities, and even illegal acts; and, (2) the 
design of audit procedures that assist in such possible 
discoveries as well as the formation of an opinion on the
2 The concept of dual cognitive tasks or dual task 
environment is unrelated to the auditing concept of dual 
purpose testing discussed in auditing literature [AICPA, 1992, 
AU 350.44].
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3
financial statements.3 The AICPA Professional Standards
require attention to each of these corollaries:
The auditor's assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements requires the 
auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and 
irregularities . . . and the complex interaction of those 
characteristics. Based on that understanding, the
auditor designs and performs appropriate audit procedures 
and evaluates the results [AICPA 1992, AU 316.06; 
emphasis added!.
Along with going concern problems, auditor interest in 
errors and irregularities have become popularly known as "red 
flags" that follow from audit procedures. It seems that 
auditors are engaged in multiple tasks simultaneously; that 
is, while the expression of an opinion on the financial
statements remains the focus of the audit, auditors are
obligated to keep other goals and objectives, like red flag
3 Auditing standards define errors as "unintentional 
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements" [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.02, emphasis in 
original]. With regard to irregularities, the following 
guidance is given:
The term irregularities refers to intentional 
misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements. Irregularities include fraudulent 
financial reporting undertaken to render financial 
statements misleading, sometimes called management fraud, 
and misappropriation of assets, sometimes called 
defalcations. [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.03 emphasis in 
original]
In either case the auditor's responsibility for detection is 
extended only to situations where the error or irregularity is 
material. Materiality is defined as follows, "the magnitude 
of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that, 
in light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that 
the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the information 
would have been changed or influenced by the omission or 
misstatement." [AICPA, 1992, AU 312.06]. All subsequent 
discussion of errors and irregularities assumes materiality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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detection, in mind as they perform the procedures necessary to 
support the audit opinion.
This is not to say that red flag detection occurs 
exclusively in a dual cognitive task environment. There are 
audit procedures specifically concerned with errors, 
irregularities such as financial fraud or defalcation. Host 
often, however, the objective of these procedures is to assess 
the likelihood that these situations exist and adjust audit 
tests of details accordingly. For example, senior members of 
an audit team may undertake specific procedures to determine 
the various exposure areas in the audit. These exposure areas 
may be communicated to other audit team members through 
discussions, an audit planning memo, or audit program changes. 
It is generally only through testing the details of 
transactions and balances, which may or may not be done by 
senior audit team members, that determinations as to whether 
errors or irregularities have occurred can be made, however.4 
In this general case, the auditor responsible for executing 
the tests of details would be advised to keep in mind the red 
flags identified and communicated previously and to be 
attentive to additional indicators present in the data. Put
4 The example presented here was a general case. There 
may be individual cases where the specific procedures aimed at 
assessing the likelihood of each of the various situations 
provide strong evidence that an error or irregularity exists. 
In such an event a directed investigation of the matter may be 
undertaken to gather evidence exclusively for the 
identification of an error or irregularity such as financial 
fraud or defalcation.
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cryptically, audit procedures serve several different 
modalities of audit judgment and decision.
Audit activity is made more difficult when one recognizes 
that audit effort is a scarce resource. Most obviously, audit 
firms exist primarily to make a profit, and that profit-focus 
gives rise to time budgets placed upon auditors. For 
practical and theoretical reasons that will be explained 
subsequently, such budgets may cause auditors to subordinate 
red flag detection —  a task not directly associated with 
these audit procedures —  to tasks for which the time budget 
holds them directly accountable. Substantive tests of details 
of balances would be one example of these latter tasks. In 
the language of cognitive psychology, auditing seems to be a 
"dual-task” paradigm where substantive tests of details would 
be considered primary cognitive tasks while red flag detection 
would be considered a secondary cognitive task.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate how 
increasing levels of time pressure mediate the performance of 
these two types of audit tasks. While others have studied the 
effect of time pressure on the performance of a single audit 
task, this study is to my knowledge the first to investigate 
the effect of time pressure on multiple audit tasks [Rhode, 
1978; Alderman and Deitrick, 1982; Lightner, Adams, and 
Lightner, 1982; Lightner, Leisenring, and Winters, 1983; Cook 
and Kelly, 1988; and Kelly and Margheim, 1990; Waggoner and 
Cashell, 1991]. In addition, McDaniel [1990] has established
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that time pressure influences the efficiency and effectiveness 
of auditors. The theoretical expectation (discussed and 
rationalized subsequently) is that at some level of time 
pressure that places auditors beyond the optimal level of 
arousal (or stress), time pressure will have a more 
detrimental effect on red flag detection than it will on the 
execution of substantive tests.
This theoretical expectation is a special case of a more 
general psychological finding that high levels of arousal 
force the range of attention toward primary tasks and away 
from secondary tasks [Eysenck, 1982; Kahneman, 1973]. At a 
practical level, conditioned by the increased competitiveness 
of the audit market, this psychological effect may explain why 
some have claimed that auditors have failed with regard to 
identifying and pursuing red flags related to financial fraud 
and other irregularities [National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, 1987; Public Oversight Board of the SEC 
Practice Section, AICPA, 1993; Board of Directors of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1993]. 
That is, if increased competitiveness gives rise to more time 
pressure; and, if such time pressure results in less attention 
to secondary tasks, then there may be a psychological reason 
for "failures'* with respect to red flag detection.
Outline of Dissertation
In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss the 
institutional issues that motivate this dissertation.
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Following that, I discuss the theoretical arguments that 
motivate an interest in the relation between dual-tasks and 
arousal. Chapter III explains the methods of inquiry. 
Analysis of the data and discussion of the results is detailed 
in Chapter IV. Chapter V concludes the dissertation with 
discussion of the implications of the study for auditors and 
audit institutions.
Motivation
Prominent researchers in cognitive accounting research 
have suggested that the field lacks an understanding of the 
context in which decisions are made [Hogarth, 1991; Ashton, 
1990; Johnson and Kaplan, 1991; Ashton, Kleinmutz, Sullivan, 
and Thomassini, 1988]. As such, they have recommended that 
future research in the area take into consideration more 
features of the decision-making environment.
Presumably, the purpose of cognitive research in auditing 
is to 1) advance the understanding of how auditors perform 
judgment and choice tasks, 2) provide some measurement of how 
well they perform these tasks, and 3) suggest ways of 
improving performance [Hogarth 1991]. Hogarth advises that, 
although researchers in the area have made important 
contributions toward the attainment of each of these three 
goals, the degree to which they can be achieved is limited 
without considering the conditions under which auditors 
operate. Although such considerations would be inappropriate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for a less developed area of study, they are necessary for
progress in more established disciplines:
In the final analysis, however, audits take place in a 
larger and more complex context than those portrayed in 
most CRA [cognitive research in auditing] studies. It is 
my belief that CRA is now mature enough to consider the 
complexities of that context. [Hogarth, 1991, p. 288]
Ashton et al. [1988, p. 104] along with Dopuch [1992] and Lord
[1992] make a similar claim:
While some attention has been devoted to cognitive issues 
outside of the input-output paradigm (e.g., memory and 
information search), the existing research largely has 
ignored the group, organizational, professional, and 
market contexts within which many audit decisions are 
made, including issues related to incentives, learning, 
feedback, and competition.
This study, as with McDaniel [1990], makes the market 
context of time pressure on auditors experimentally salient 
and is thus responsive to such claims and appeals. 
Interestingly, Hogarth [1991, p. 288] identified time pressure 
as an example of such a contextual factor —  "What, for 
example, are the effects of time pressure and/or the riskiness 
of different types of audits?" Although time pressure has 
been found to have significant effects on the execution of 
auditing procedures, Hogarth's comments indicate that little 
is known about its effects on the cognitive processes of 
auditors. Cognitive processes are, of course, the object of 
inquiry in cognitive accounting research.
Motivation for this dissertation does not emanate 
exclusively from the academic community, however. The 
motivating conditions are found in the practice of auditing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
itself. Particularly, the relevance of the challenge facing 
the profession to become more active in its role of detecting 
red flags serves as a primary motivating factor. The 
significance of this challenge is evidenced by a recent 
statement of the Board of Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 2], 
"The public looks to the independent auditor to detect fraud, 
and it is the auditor's responsibility to do so."
While this is the view of the Board of Directors of the 
AICPA, it may not be shared by everyone in the profession. 
There are those who may claim that auditors are not and should 
not be responsible for financial fraud detection. They 
generally point out that Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) 
No. 53 disclaims full responsibility for financial fraud 
detection with statements emphasizing the audit concept of 
reasonable rather than complete assurance. The argument is 
made that financial frauds are often complex and very 
difficult for auditors to detect with standard procedures. 
These arguments, while valid, do not account for other 
sections of SAS No. 53 that identify several red flags 
associated with errors and irregularities with the purpose of 
encouraging the auditor to consider them in planning, 
designing, and executing audit procedures. Clearly, auditing 
standards indicate the importance of attending to red flags as 
indicators of potential errors or irregularities in the 
client's records. Recent statements of the Board of Directors 
of the AICPA, the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Section of the AICPA, the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting and researchers who have proposed models 
to improve auditor detection and interpretation of red flags 
[Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham, 1989] provide support for 
the belief that auditors are responsible for the detection of 
financial fraud. External auditors' role as independent 
investigators perhaps makes them more responsible, at least in 
theory, for the detection of financial fraud than internal 
oversight functions. As functional units within many clients, 
internal audit departments may not be charged with the mission 
of detecting financial fraud. Their focus may be more on the 
detection of defalcations or embezzlements or other 
operational concerns rather than financial fraud. External 
auditors, on the other hand, are responsible for executing 
audit procedures that provide reasonable assurance as to 
whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. Financial fraud is one situation that causes 
financial statements to be materially misstated. Requirements 
within SAS No. 53 clearly indicate that attention to red flags 
that may signal misstatements due to errors, defalcations, or 
financial fraud is a key element allowing audit procedures to 
provide such assurance. Although the standard states that 
auditors are not guarantors of the financial statements, it is 
clear that auditor responsibility is increased when red flags 
are present. For this reason, auditor attention to red flags.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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especially as they may be indicators of potential financial 
fraud, is a significant issue facing the profession.
Also motivating this dissertation is the belief that 
auditors have been deficient in their role as detectors of red 
flags. This belief has been expressed, either directly or 
indirectly, by several different groups. The Board of 
Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 1] listed "Improving the 
prevention and detection of fraud" first among the five key 
areas in which reforms were being pursued. The Public 
Oversight Board of the SEC practice section of the AICPA
[1993], a board formed to oversee the quality control 
practices of the firms that audit publicly held companies, 
recently stated that there is a widespread belief that 
auditors are not meeting their responsibilities for the 
detection of financial fraud. They made several
recommendations aimed at improving auditor performance in this 
critical area. The National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, or Treadway Commission, was charged with 
the mission of identifying causal factors that can lead to 
financial fraud and steps to reduce its incidence. Although 
this commission did indicate that audits play a significant 
role in detecting financial fraud, its report added that 
independent accountants can and should do more. Also 
commenting on the auditor's role in fraud detection was a 
comprehensive fraud survey conducted by a major accounting 
firm. In this survey, it was reported that only three percent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of the frauds commented upon by survey respondents were 
detected by external auditors [Coogan and Carey, 1993, p. 
10].5 These statements and findings, coupled with the fact 
that, as of October, 1993, the accounting profession had been 
named in lawsuits aggregating to $15 billion (many of which 
have been filed for alleged failure to detect fraud during 
audits) [Wells et al., 1993] reinforce the perception that 
auditors have been deficient in their role of detecting 
indicators of potential financial fraud.
Given that this issue is an important one to the 
profession and that there are perceived deficiencies in the 
current level at which auditors perform their role, it would 
follow that there is a need for research investigating the 
possible sources of these deficiencies. Toward that end, the 
Board of Directors of the AICPA [1993, p. 3] has called for a 
research program to learn "... what audit procedures did detect 
or might have detected the illegality and how audits can be 
changed to prevent reoccurrence." Although the Board called 
for a case study approach, the research question is similar to 
that addressed by this dissertation— why do auditors fail in 
meeting expectations in the area of red flag detection. This 
dissertation addresses this research question by presenting
5 This finding may be qualified somewhat by the fact 
that only one percent of the frauds commented upon in the 
survey were identified as "false financial statements" [KPMG 
Peat Marwick, 1993, p. 6]. Despite this qualification, the 
finding has important implications for the auditor's cognitive 
predisposition toward the detection of indicators of potential 
financial fraud.
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and analyzing data gathered in an experiment in which 
practicing auditors are called upon to execute an auditing 
task. Before detailing the experimental task, however, the 
theoretical foundation supporting this type of inquiry is 
discussed.




Having asserted that a perceived deficiency exists with 
regard to auditors' performance in the arena of red flag 
detection, this dissertation now focuses on sources of this 
perceived deficiency. It may be appropriate to consider 
auditors' failure to detect red flags as a member of a class 
of behaviors that the literature labels "dysfunctional" audit 
behaviors. Time pressure has been identified as a feature of 
the auditing context that may lead to several dysfunctional 
behaviors such as underreporting of audit hours, premature 
signoff, and superficial review of client documents [Kelly and 
Margheim, 1990]. The following discussion surveys the 
research into the effects of time pressure on "dysfunctional" 
auditor behaviors.
The market context in which auditors operate has 
increased the importance of efficiency as well as 
effectiveness in auditing performance. As a result auditors 
are constrained by increasingly stringent time budgets 
[Loebbecke and Steinbart, 1987]. In addition to the 
constraints placed on the time allowed to carry out audit 
procedures, the increase in the number of lawsuits filed 
against auditors has demanded greater accountability for the 
results of the procedures applied under time pressure [Lord 
and DeZoort, 1992]. When these demands for increased
14
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efficiency and increased effectiveness conflict, auditors are 
likely to experience what Schuler [1980] terns demand stress. 
Stress has been shown to produce certain cognitive responses 
in individuals in which affective considerations displace 
logical or empirical considerations in information processing 
[Etzioni, 1988]. Among these responses is a reduction in the 
range of cue utilization in attentional processes.
Put broadly, the institutional context of this study is 
based upon the notion that both the economics of auditing and 
the cognitive conditions that inform auditors give rise to a 
predictable tendency to discount the relevance of secondary 
tasks (e.g., red flag detection) as time pressure increases. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews the literature that 
discusses the economics of auditing and the cognitive 
conditions that are expected to be operationalized in the 
auditing context.
Time Pressure and the Economics of Auditing
Both competitive bidding for audit services and 
heightened attention to audit costs have become significant 
factors in the market for auditing services, particularly 
after the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct was revised in 
1972. In response to the increased competition, auditors have 
placed greater emphasis on time budgets and the discovery and 
utilization of more efficient procedures [Loebbecke and 
Steinbart, 1987].
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The audit program plays an important role in defining the 
procedures to be employed in the execution of an audit and in 
allocating budgeted hours to various audit areas. It 
typically includes a list of the procedures, the timing of 
tests, the sample sizes, and an indication of which items to 
examine in order to carry out the audit within an acceptable 
level of audit risk. The audit program serves as a means of 
directing the auditor's attention to the items relevant to the 
testing of assertions associated with the various transaction 
cycles and accounts in order to achieve audit objectives.
The possibility exists that audit procedures might not be 
executed as required by the audit program. This can result in 
increased nonsampling risk. Nonsampling risk refers to the 
possibility that audit tests will fail to reveal exceptions 
existing in an audit sample. To the extent that the failure 
to carry out tests as designed results in either inappropriate 
procedures being executed or the auditor's failure to 
recognize an exception, nonsampling risk is increased. Given 
that increased nonsampling risk can result in significant 
audit deficiencies, it would be appropriate to examine the 
reasons why audit procedures are not executed as planned.
Although its effects are not always negative [e.g., 
Waggoner and Cashell, 1991], time pressure has been identified 
as a feature of the auditing environment that might result in 
deviations from the audit program. Audit firms impose time 
budgets in an attempt to increase efficiency. At appropriate
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levels time pressure can, indeed, increase processing speed 
and reduce the amount of time spent attending to non-task 
related cues [Ben Zur and Breznitz, 1981; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson, 1988]. Researchers have attempted to ascertain 
whether time pressure is being imposed at levels conducive to 
increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of auditor 
performance or at levels at which departures from the audit 
program occur. The following discussion highlights some of 
those efforts.
Apparently, time pressure in auditing became an object of 
research when Rhode [1978] surveyed 1,126 practicing auditors 
and 400 retired auditors on various aspects of the 
institutionalized context of auditing. Over 48 percent of 
respondents indicated increasing pressure to reduce hours 
worked during the three previous years. The same percentage 
believed time pressure impacts the quality of audits 
negatively. Twenty three percent admitted to having signed- 
off on procedures without having performed them. Thirty-one 
percent believed that excessive time pressure motivates 
auditors to sign-off prematurely.
Several researchers conducted follow-up studies [Alderman 
and Deitrick, 1982; Lightner, Adams and Lightner, 1982; and 
Lightner, Leisenring, and Winters, 1983]. Results essentially 
confirmed Rhode's findings. For example, Alderman and 
Deitrick's [1982] study of Big Eight auditors found that 31 
percent of seniors and 23 percent of staff believed that
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auditors in their firm had prematurely signed-off on 
procedures.
Lightner, Adams, and Lightner [1982] and Lightner, 
Leisenring, and Winters [1983] found that underreporting of 
time worked was a consequence of time pressure. Although the 
underreporting of audit hours would not seem to reduce audit 
quality as directly as a premature sign-off might, some 
consider that it does tend to produce long-run dysfunctions 
for the quality of auditing [Kelly and Margheim, 1990; 
Waggoner and Cashell, 1991].
The studies mentioned above examined the effects of time 
pressure on auditing tests and procedures. Kelly and Margheim 
[1990] studied the effect of time pressure on a wider range of 
auditing phenomena. In particular, they were concerned with 
the effect of time pressure on the thoroughness of the audit 
procedures that were applied. Twenty-five percent of 
respondents reported that, as a consequence of time pressure, 
they had performed somewhat superficial reviews of client 
documents on their most recent audit.
Further evidence that time pressure is a significant 
factor in the auditing environment comes from an internal 
investigation of factors contributing to success in public 
accounting performed by a major accounting firm. The results 
of this investigation, a survey of successful senior auditors, 
indicated that the ability to handle stressful situations was 
consistently rated as a very important factor for success in
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the profession. In fact, in the rating of 122 potential 
factors for success, four of the six most important factors 
had to do with the ability to perform under conditions of time 
pressure (see Appendix A for a listing of the top-rated 
factors).
It would appear, based on the findings reported in the 
literature, that time pressure is a salient feature of the 
auditing environment that produces several dysfunctions. 
Given that, the focus now turns to the issue of whether the 
perceived deficiency in auditor attention to red flags is 
another dysfunctional behavior that may be attributable, in 
part, to time pressure. This analysis begins by considering 
the overall audit risk model as it relates to red flag 
detection and time pressure.
Audit risk has been defined as "the risk that the 
auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his 
opinion on financial statements that are materially 
misstated." [AICPA, 1992, AU 312.02]. Failure to detect red 
flags is clearly and positively correlated with the likelihood 
that financial statements may be materially misstated. In 
terms of the audit risk model, time pressure can affect the 
nonsampling component of detection risk. Nonsampling risk 
exists because applying an audit procedure to all transactions 
or balances may still result in a failure to detect a material 
misstatement. Nonsampling risk is increased in situations 
where the audit procedures selected are not appropriate to
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obtain the specific objective or where auditors may fail to 
recognize material misstatements in the documents that are 
examined. McDaniel [1990] experimentally examined the effects 
of time pressure on audit performance and found that increased 
time pressure was associated with decreased processing 
accuracy and decreased sampling adequacy. Both of these 
dysfunctional behaviors effectively increase nonsampling risk 
and, therefore, increase audit risk.6 So, although the 
statements on auditing standards claim that, "[n]onsampling 
risk can be reduced to a negligible level through such factors 
as adequate planning and supervision" [AICPA, 1992, AU 
350.11], McDaniel's study indicates that time pressure is a 
factor that works against such efforts. Studies identifying 
some of the dysfunctional effects of time pressure in the 
auditing environment indicate that there is reason to believe 
that more than a negligible level of nonsampling risk may 
result.
The arousal produced when auditors perceive the allotted 
time to be insufficient to execute procedures and judgments as 
required by the audit program should produce what Schuler
[1980] terms demand stress. Demand stress arises when 
decision makers perceive that they will not be able to 
complete the task as initially required. The psychology
6 As noted by McDaniel [1990], decreased sampling 
adequacy is indicative of increased sampling risk. Decreased 
sampling adequacy may also increase nonsampling risk in that 
the procedure for selecting the sample (an audit procedure) is 
inappropriate.
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literature has addressed the positive and negative effects of 
arousing conditions such as demand stress. The following 
section combines this literature with the institutional 
context of time pressure in auditing in order to provide a 
theoretical structure for the empirical inquiry described 
here.
Responses to Stress
Demand stress induces several responses that may not
occur under less stressful conditions. Holsti [1978, p. 44]
summarizes the findings with regard to the effects of stress
on individuals' information processing behavior:
[Stress leads to]... increased random behavior; increased 
rate of error; regression to simple and more primitive 
modes of response; problem solving rigidity; diminished 
focus of attention, across both time and space; reduced 
ability to discriminate the dangerous from the trivial; 
diminished scope of complex perceptual activity; loss of 
abstract ability; disorientation of visual motor 
coordination... [T]olerance for ambiguity is reduced 
under high stress. Under these conditions individuals 
made decisions before adequate information was available, 
with the result that they performed much less capably 
than persons working under normal conditions.
Weick [1983, p. 355] noted several similar responses to
stress— "People notice fewer details, they look for shorter
periods of time, and they assimilate novel perceptions to
events they have seen before.” In addition, Weick indicated
that there is evidence that people revert to dominant, first-
learned patterns of response rather than those that were more
recently learned.
While the statements made by Holsti [1978] and Weick
[1983] identify a number of apparently disparate effects of
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stress, there may be an underlying concept that links them. 
Several studies indicate that stress may impede the ability to 
deal with complex or new issues. Stress may thus cause 
individuals to ignore anything that adds to their cognitive 
burden. This reductive effect may have serious implications 
for auditors. The nature of the auditor's role is to 
understand the complexities of the client's business and to 
interpret detailed information in light of these complex 
relationships. If too much importance is placed upon the 
accumulation of details without the necessary interpretation 
of them in light of complexities, auditors may lose their 
attitude of professional skepticism and become averse to 
executing cognitively complex analyses.
The source of this limitation on the ability to execute 
cognitively complex procedures may reside in individuals' 
attentional processes. Probably the most notable of all 
responses to stress are detailed in the "Easterbrook 
hypothesis" and the "behavioral law." Initially proposed by 
Easterbrook [1959], the hypothesis that there is a progressive 
reduction in the range of cue utilization that accompanies 
increases in arousal (stress) has been confirmed in several 
more recent studies (see Eysenck [1982] for a review of thirty 
studies reporting such results). In routine tasks where 
attention to only a few cues is required, increased arousal 
should increase performance on the task by reducing the extent 
to which attention is paid to extraneous cues, thereby
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increasing processing speed. When arousal increases to the 
point that the cues that are filtered out are crucial to the 
performance of the task, performance decrements should be 
observed.
By expressing the effects of arousal in terms of their 
effects on attention, Easterbrook provided theoretical support 
for the Yerkes-Dodson law [Yerkes and Dodson, 1908]. The 
Yerkes-Dodson law describes two characteristics of the 
relationship between arousal and performance. First, it holds 
that an inverted-U shaped relationship exists between arousal 
and performance; that is, performance is best at some 
intermediate, optimizing level of arousal. The second 
assertion is that this optimal level of arousal varies 
inversely with the level of task complexity. Thus peak 
performance on complex tasks is presumed facilitated by low 
levels of arousal, while peak performance on simple tasks is 
facilitated by high levels of arousal. Easterbrook's 
formulation of the effects of arousal on attention provides a 
potential explanation of the inverse relationship between the 
optimal level of arousal and task complexity as stated by the 
Yerkes-Dodson law. The two views can be theoretically linked 
by associating the onset of decreased performance with the 
filtering out of cues that are crucial to task performance. 
Given that complex tasks often require attention to a wider 
range of cues; and, given that the range of attention is 
reduced as arousal increases, it follows that cues relevant to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the execution of complex tasks are likely to be outside of the 
reduced range of attention associated with increased arousal. 
The relationship between the Yerkes-Dodson law and the 
Easterbrook hypothesis is depicted graphically in Figure 1. 
The top graph in Figure 1 depicts both of the major tenets of 
the Yerkes-Dodson law. The inverted-U shape of each of the 
curves demonstrates that performance of a given task is 
optimized at some intermediate level of arousal. The relative 
position of the two inverted-U shaped curves demonstrates that 
the level of arousal necessary to achieve optimum performance 
on a complex task is less than that required for optimum 
performance on a simpler task. The bottom graph depicts the 
Easterbrook hypothesis by showing that as arousal increases 
the number of cues attended to decreases. Under high levels 
of arousal, relatively few cues may be considered. The 
integration of the two graphs demonstrates that the number of 
cues to be considered in order to achieve optimum performance 
of a complex task is higher than the number required for 
optimum performance of a simpler task. If the level of 
arousal experienced by an individual is higher than that which 
is optimal for the performance of the assigned task, it would 
be reasonable to expect this individual to attend to a smaller 
number of cues than would be optimal, perhaps resulting in a 
lower than optimal level of performance.
Kahneman [1973, p. 38] summarizes the research 
investigating the Easterbrook hypothesis as follows:
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This research demonstrates that high arousal causes 
attention to be concentrated on the dominant aspects of 
the situation at the expense of other aspects. As 
Easterbrook noted, such a change of allocation policy 
will disrupt any performance in which attention must be 
deployed over a wide range of cues.
Auditing tasks do, indeed, require attention to be deployed
over a wide range of cues in many situations. In fact, the
"ability to see the 'big picture' in addition to the details
of a particular task," and the "ability to analyze information
and facts and understand relationships between facts" were
rated as two of the most important factors for success as an
auditor [Eldridge, 1992, see Appendix A]. These are precisely
the types of skills that the Easterbrook hypothesis predicts
will be impaired under conditions of arousal. Given that time
pressure, a potentially arousing agent, is salient in the
auditing environment, the Easterbrook hypothesis predicts that
performance on tasks judged to be crucial for success as an
auditor will sometimes be impaired.
The behavioral law is closely related to the Easterbrook
hypothesis. It states that increased arousal increases the
probability of the occurrence of the most dominant response
[Hull, 1943]. The Easterbrook hypothesis provides a plausible
explanation for the behavioral law; because the range of cues
utilized is reduced under stress, the dominant response has a
higher probability of occurrence.
The preceding discussion established the prediction that
a reduction in the range of cues attended to will occur under
arousal with an increased probability that the dominant cue











S = Performance curve for a simple task
C = Performance curve for a complex task
* = Number of cues required for the optimum level of
performance of a simple task
** = Number of cues required for the optimum level of
performance of a complex task
Figure 1
Graphical Relationship between the Yerkes-Dodson Law 
and the Easterbrook Hypothesis
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will capture attention. The focus now becomes the explanation 
of why such effects should be noted. In addition to 
explaining why such effects are likely to occur, the 
literature will be called upon to outline the properties of 
the cues that are likely to be dominant. From this analysis, 
it should be possible to predict which types of cues auditors 
will attend to under varying conditions of time pressure.
Explanations of the Responses to Stress 
Several speculative models of information processing have 
attempted to provide insight as to why responses to arousal 
noted by Easterbrook and Hull are likely to occur. Martindale
[1981] proposed a hierarchical feature model based on the 
frameworks developed by Sokolov [1960] and Walley and Weiden 
[1973, 1974]. Hierarchical feature models are models with 
multiple levels of cognitive processing units that possess 
properties of upward excitation and lateral inhibition.7 As 
they are general models of the determinants of cognitive 
activity under a variety of conditions, they presumably can 
provide insight into the determinants of auditors' responses 
to stress.
Martindale's [1981] model conceptualizes primary memory 
(or consciousness) as the set of currently activated cognitive 
units and attention as a subset of these units (usually a
7 In order to present a more parsimonious account of 
processing activity, discussion of the levels of processing 
units will not be undertaken.
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subset of one) that is most strongly activated.8 Activation
of cognitive units nay result from arousal potential of the
stimuli present in the task with which the individual is
involved or the environment in which it takes place. When an
arousing stimulus is perceived, activation is spread
throughout the system to all of the cognitive units. Because
of the property of lateral inhibition and the way that this
increased activation is theorized to interact with the
cognitive units, those cognitive units that were more
activated than the others prior to the perception of the
arousing agent will receive most of the additional activation
introduced to the system and become even more strongly
activated following the response. Martindale [1981, p. 251]
restates the Easterbrook hypothesis and the behavioral law in
terms of the hierarchical feature model as follows:
Increasing arousal increases the activation of the 
dominant or strongest unit relative to the activation of 
other units. ... [T]he most activated unit is the one that 
captures attention.
Because attention was defined to be the subset of cognitive
units most activated at a given point in time and cognitive
units may be analogous to cues, increasing arousal increases
the probability that the dominant cue will be attended. In
tasks where improved performance depends on both reducing the
number of cues attended to and processing a few key cues more
8 The term activation is used here to be consistent with 
Martindale's [1981] model. The term excitation, as it has 
been used in other models, is virtually synonymous with 
activation in this context.
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efficiently, increased arousal may be beneficial. In tasks 
where improved performance depends on attending to a wider 
range of cues and integrating them into an overall 
conceptualization of the task, increased arousal may hinder 
performance.
The hierarchical feature model described above may 
provide theoretical support for the Easterbrook hypothesis and 
the behavioral law. Several studies of attention provide 
empirical support to augment the theoretical support. The 
performance decrements associated with increased arousal are 
often most pronounced and visible in situations where two 
tasks are being performed at the same time. For this reason, 
a dual-task paradigm has typically been employed to study the 
effects of arousal on attention.
The dual-task methodology for addressing the issue of cue 
utilization typically involves concurrent performance of what 
are labelled "primary" and "subsidiary" tasks. Broadbent 
[1971] and Kahneman [1973] theorized that individuals do not 
utilize all of their attentional capacity in most routine 
tasks. When arousal is increased for subjects performing 
dual-tasks, they may respond by diverting excess attentional 
resources to the primary task. These resources might be 
diverted from non-task related activities or from the 
subsidiary task.9 In designing the tasks such that
9 In situations where the primary task requires all 
attentional resources prior to the introduction of arousal, 
the diversion of resources may come from the primary task
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
performance on the task is indicative of attention10, insight 
is gained into the claim made by the Easterbrook hypothesis 
that the range of attention will narrow under arousing 
conditions. Several types of results, discussed below, could 
be supportive of the Easterbrook hypothesis in this paradigm.
When arousal is introduced and individuals can allocate 
attentional resources previously used for non-task related 
activities to the "primary" task, performance on the primary 
task may increase with no significant effect being observed on 
the subsidiary task [Davies and Jones, 1975; Dornbush, 1965; 
Hockey, 1970a; Hockey, 1970c]. Although these results cannot 
be conclusively linked to the Easterbrook hypothesis of 
attentional narrowing, it does provide a plausible 
explanation. The results might indicate that the two tasks 
initially required fewer attentional resources than were 
available, resulting in resources being expended upon 
activities not related to either task. The increased arousal 
may have caused attentional resources to be diverted from the 
non-task related activities to activities associated with the 
primary task. This diversion in resources would cause an
itself. These types of tasks could be studied outside of the 
dual-task paradigm because the effects on any subsidiary tasks 
should be negligible (due to the possibility that very few 
resources would have been allocated to the subsidiary task in 
the initial condition).
10 Attention has also been referred to as effort or 
concentration. The link between the construct of attention 
and performance has been made in Kahneman [1973] and Eysenck
[1982].
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increased level of performance on the main task without 
affecting performance on the subsidiary task. It is from this 
response that the upward-sloping portion of the inverted-U 
shaped curve linking arousal and performance may be observed.
When increased arousal causes attentional resources to be 
diverted from the subsidiary task rather than non-task related 
activities, performance on this task can be expected to fall. 
The performance decrement on the subsidiary task under arousal 
appears to be indicative of attentional narrowing. When 
performance on the primary task increases in conjunction with 
such an effect, a reallocation of attention is suggested 
[Eysenck, 1982]. Results supportive of this effect [Kausler, 
Tr app, and Brewer, 1959; Bahrick, 1954; Bahrick, Fitts, and 
Rankin, 1952; Rubin, Shantz, and Smock, 1962; Hockey, 1970b; 
Hockey and Hamilton, 1970] would most likely, again, be 
associated with the upward-sloping portion of the Yerkes- 
Dodson curve.11
11 Although, only a small increase in performance of the 
primary task coupled with a large decrement on the subsidiary 
task would probably indicate that performance is on the 
downward-sloping portion of the curve. The actual location on 
the performance curve depends on the trade-off between 
performance on the subsidiary and primary tasks. If the 
subsidiary task is very incidental to overall performance, 
even large performance decrements would have relatively little 
impact on overall performance. If the subsidiary task is 
important, however, it would impact performance more 
adversely. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to 
examine the nature of this trade-off for tasks outside of the 
particular audit task which will be detailed in a subsequent 
section.
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When a decrease in performance on a subsidiary task is 
accompanied by unchanged performance on a primary task, it is 
clear that the overall performance level would decline. This 
result would be indicative of a level of arousal that induces 
the type of performance decrements associated with the 
downward sloping portion of the Yerkes-Dodson curve. Many 
studies provide results supportive of this effect [Bacon, 
1974; Kohn, 1954; McNamara and Fisch, 1964; Tecce and Tarnell, 
1965; Thornton and Powell, 1974; Wachtel, 1968; Miller and 
Dost, 1964; Silverman and Blitz, 1956; Weltman and Egstrom, 
1966; Weltman, Smith, and Egstrom, 1971; Johnson and Thomson, 
1962; Wolk and DuCette, 1974; Bell, 1978; Boggs and Simon, 
1968; Cohen and Lezak, 1977; Davies and Jones, 1975; Finkelman 
and Glass, 1970; O'Malley and Poplawsky, 1971], These results 
provide strong evidence supportive of the Easterbrook 
hypothesis. They indicate that, under arousal, attention may 
become more focused on the cues most relevant to the primary 
task at the expense of attention given to cues associated with 
the secondary task.
Studies examining the level of time pressure present in 
the auditing environment appear to indicate that the problem 
facing the auditor is one where tasks are left incomplete in 
response to arousing conditions, implying that the last group 
of studies referenced above, where performance on neither task 
increases, would have the most relevance for this study. None 
of the studies of the auditing environment have examined which
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type of tasks are likely to be affected most adversely. The 
dual-task paradigm used to study attention could lend insight 
into this issue in the context of auditing.
Selection of the Dominant Cue
In addition to predicting that there will be a reduction 
in the range of cue utilization under stress and explaining 
why this reduction is expected to occur, the literature also 
provides the basis to predict which types of cues will draw 
attention. The likelihood that a given stimulus will attract 
an individual's attention is related to the extent that the 
stimulus possesses arousal potential. Berlyne [1971] and 
Martindale [1981] discuss the links between attention and 
sources and levels of arousal potential.
The relationship between arousal potential and attention 
is hypothetically expected to take the form of an inverted-U. 
Attention will be drawn toward stimuli as arousal potential 
increases until it reaches the point where increasing 
attention will initiate an aversive response. Berlyne [1971] 
theorizes that a pleasure system is activated by stimuli 
possessing a low level of arousal potential. As the arousal 
potential increases, the pleasure system will become more 
activated and will be more likely to draw attention to the 
stimulus. Berlyne contends that a displeasure (or aversion] 
system becomes activated when a stimulus possesses higher 
levels of arousal potential thus causing attention to be 
averted from the stimulus. This effect is important because
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it introduces the concept of the level of attention paid to a 
stimulus, a concept related to that of levels of processing 
proposed by Craik and Lockhart [1972]. The level at which a 
stimulus is attended to may be analogous to the level at which 
the stimulus is processed. Within Craik and Lockhart's 
theory, deeper processing involves a greater understanding or 
interpretation of a stimulus. So, while attention will be 
drawn to many stimuli, the level of attention given to them 
may or may not allow the processing of meaning. The effect of 
the reduction of the range of attention in response to arousal 
described by Easterbrook may be more accurately described in 
some cases as a reduction of the range of cues processed 
deeply. This phenomenon is analogous to the finding of 
increased attentional lability under arousal documented by 
Eysenck [1982]. The level of attention and depth at which 
cues are processed depends upon the properties of the arousal 
potential associated with a given stimulus.
Arousal potential can result from three properties of 
stimuli— psychophysical, ecological, and collative. 
Psychophysical properties can be described as the physical 
intensity of the stimulus (e.g. loudness, brightness, etc.). 
Ecological properties can be characterized as signal value, 
meaning, or significance. Novelty, complexity, incongruity, 
surprise, ambiguity, and conflict are all examples of 
collative properties of stimuli.
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The arousal potential resulting from ecological 
properties of a stimulus permits the deepest level of 
processing. Psychophysical and collative properties may draw 
attention to a given stimulus, but if the meaning of the 
stimulus is not apparent, it will only be processed at a 
surface level. The cues can only be understood when the 
ecological properties of the stimulus are attended to and 
processed. Within the dual-task paradigm in a situation where 
the primary and subsidiary tasks require a relatively deep 
level of processing, attending to the collative properties of 
a stimulus may not be sufficient to obtain an understanding of 
the cues. The meaning (or ecological properties) of the 
relationship possessing these collative properties may need to 
be explored. When the stimulus possessing these collative 
properties is associated with the subsidiary task and the 
amount of attention required to derive the meaning behind the 
relationship would detract from performance of the primary 
task, it may be that the arousal associated with the prospect 
of pursuing the relationship would reach the point where 
attention would be withdrawn from the stimulus. Recalling 
that stress increases the level of arousal present in the 
system and that this arousal exaggerates any of the 
differences in arousal potential of stimuli that might occur 
in non-stressful situations, it would follow that the effects 
described above would be more salient under stressful 
conditions.
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Berlyne [1963, 1971] explains such a phenomenon by
asserting that the optimal level of arousal potential is not 
a maximal or a minimal level. When the level of arousal is 
too high, discomfort in the form of stress, a negative 
affective state, results. Individuals will attempt to alter 
their stimulus field so as to remove themselves from negative 
affective states to a state where an optimal level of arousal 
potential is experienced [Fiske and Maddi, 1961; Hunt, 1963; 
Berlyne, 1960, 1963]. Pieters and Van Raaij [1988, p. 128] 
explain how individuals achieve such a state: "A decrease of 
arousal potential is reached by 'solving' the inconsistencies 
in the present stimulus field or by attending to less 
stimuli."
Pieters and Van Raaij' s statement emphasizes the two ways 
in which the narrowing of attention under stress may occur. 
It may be the result of the tendency for increased activation 
associated with stress to exacerbate any differences between 
the arousal potential of cues. This tendency would cause cues 
whose arousal potential may have been sufficient to draw 
attention prior to arousal to remain unattended to in the 
stressful environment. In this case arousal would appear to 
activate a sort of pre-attention filtering mechanism. On the 
other hand, it may be the result of the negative affect 
associated with continued attention to (and processing of) 
cues that do not contribute directly to performance of the
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primary task. In a sense, what is described is a sort of 
attentional copin? mechanism.
These comments indicate a tendency toward a strategy of 
simplification under conditions of arousal. Such a strategy 
would seem to conflict with the requirements of professional 
auditing standards.
The Dual-Task Paradigm in the Auditing Environment
McDaniel's [1990] study provided significant insight into 
the effects of time pressure in the auditing environment. 
McDaniel focused on the extent to which performance of a 
single task was affected by time pressure.12 The models 
presented above indicate that the earliest and most 
significant effects of time pressure may not be detected with 
an analysis that examines performance on only one task. They 
indicate that these effects are likely to have a significant 
impact on a subsidiary task when two tasks are being performed 
concurrently.
The question then arises as to whether or not auditors 
are faced with situations where they are required to perform 
two tasks concurrently. As discussed in the introduction, it 
seems quite clear that auditors do, indeed, perform concurrent
12 This discussion is not meant to detract from the 
significance of McDaniel's study in any way. In fact, 
McDaniel's study provides the important foundation upon which 
this study attempts to build through incorporation of an 
altered version of the test instrument, operationalizing the 
construct of time pressure in the same way, and measuring 
audit output performance similarly. Despite these
similarities, this study cannot and does not attempt to 
replicate McDaniel's results.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
tasks. It is also evident that the same audit procedures
serve multiple purposes with respect to auditor judgment and
decision. The authoritative standard regarding errors and
irregularities cited in the introduction makes that point
explicitly. The following excerpt from the professional
standard that gives guidance on the auditor's responsibility
to detect possible violations of the going concern assumption
substantiates that claim:
It is not necessary to design audit procedures solely to 
identify conditions and events that, when considered in 
aggregate, indicate that there could be substantial doubt 
about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern 
for a reasonable period of time. The results of auditing 
procedures designed and performed to achieve other audit 
objectives should be sufficient for that purpose. [AICPA 
1992, AU 341.05]
The following assertions, then, can be drawn from the 
relevant accounting and psychology literature: (1) time
pressure is a salient feature of the auditing environment; (2) 
increased arousal, which may be induced by time pressure, can 
cause attention to become more focused on primary-task-related 
cues at the expense of attention given to secondary cues; 
and, (3) the auditing context is a dual cognitive task 
environment in which the complex task of attending to red 
flags may be considered secondary to other tasks. The 
research hypothesis that in the auditing environment time 
pressure may cause auditors' attention to become focused on 
cues related to test of details tasks at the expense of 
attention to red flags emerges from these assertions.
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Intuitive support for this research hypothesis may be
derived from the recommendations of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, the so-called Treadway
Commission. The Treadway Commission made several observations
and recommendations to independent public accountants. Among
them was the following observation with regard to the
assignment of responsibility for the consequences of
fraudulent reporting:
In many cases, although indications of possible 
improprieties, or "red flags," existed, independent 
public accountants failed to recognize or pursue them 
with skepticism. The SEC believed that, if the 
independent public accountants had investigated these red 
flags, the fraudulent activity would have had a greater 
likelihood of being uncovered. [National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p.25]
In assessing why such oversights were so common, the
commission went on to note the following situation:
Intense competition among accounting firms contributes to 
significant pressure on audit fees, cften with 
corresponding pressure to reduce staff, time budgets, and 
partner involvement in audit engagements. Such pressures 
may not be conducive to the thorough investigation of red 
flags indicating the potential for fraudulent financial 
reporting or to the thorough exercise of professional 
judgment and skepticism. [National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987, p. 56]
As a result, they went on to make the recommendation that,
"Public accounting firms should recognize and control the
organizational and individual pressures that potentially
reduce audit quality." [National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, 1987, p. 56] Clearly, the research
hypothesis stated above is consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the Treadway Commission.
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In the current Congressional session, Representative 
Wyden has proposed House Resolution 574, the so-called 
Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act. Although the 
bill basically reaffirms the responsibilities for financial 
fraud detection and reporting communicated in auditing 
standards, this action serves as an indication of the 
government's increased interest in the way in which auditors 
address the issue of financial fraud and red flag detection. 
The proposed study may serve to clarify the factors 
influencing auditors' ability to attend to red flags.
These events, observations, and recommendations add to 
the compelling reasons for undertaking this study. They 
indicate that the significant pressures placed upon auditors 
may cause them to subordinate red flag detection, a task not 
directly associated with specific audit procedures, to tasks 
for which the time budget holds them directly accountable, 
such as substantive tests of details of balances. As such, 
these tasks would be considered primary tasks in the dual-task 
paradigm while red flag detection would be considered a 
subsidiary task. Support for this conceptualization of the 
auditing environment may be found in recent statements made by 
the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, AICPA 
[1993]:
Before the turn of the century both auditors and the 
users of audited financial information regarded the 
detection of fraud as one of the primary purposes of an 
audit. For many reasons the profession has moved from an 
acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in 
detecting fraud is secondary to the other purposes of
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audits. In contrast, the public has continued to regard 
fraud detection as an important goal of the audit 
process— and now attaches even greater importance to that 
goal [Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, 
AICPA, 1993, p. 42].
The time budget is a very tangible means of assessing 
performance. As such, the ability to meet the time budget is 
a criterion for evaluation on most audits. Feedback on this 
aspect of the auditor's performance is timely and clear. 
Measures of an auditor's attitude of professional skepticism 
and attention to complex issues is far less tangible. Should 
an audit fail to reveal an irregularity that was present at 
the time of the audit, it may not be detected promptly, if at 
all. Feedback on this matter is not as timely. Because 
auditors are immediately accountable for performing audit 
procedures within the guidelines of the time budget and less 
immediately accountable for their attention to broader issues, 
they may have a tendency to treat procedures as the primary 
task and other issues as subsidiary tasks.
Figure 2 graphically depicts the relationship between the 
Easterbrook hypothesis and the Yerkes-Dodson Law within the 
auditing context. The task of executing auditing tests of 
details while being attentive to red flags is a relatively 
complex task. The task of merely executing auditing tests of 
details without being attentive to red flags is a relatively 
simple task. When time budgets are set restrictively, 
auditors may experience increased levels of arousal. Indeed, 
the perception that the time allotted may be insufficient to










S = Performance curve for executing the tests of details task
C = Performance curve for the dual-tasks of concurrently
attending to red flags and executing tests of details
* = Number of cues required for the optimum level of
performance of the tests of details task
** = Number of cues required for the optimum level of
performance of the concurrent attention task
Figure 2
Graphical Relationship between the Yerkes-Dodson Law and 
the Easterbrook Hypothesis in the Auditing Context
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complete the procedures as assigned may induce more arousal. 
At this heightened level of arousal, auditors may find 
themselves unable to attend to the full range of cues required 
to concurrently execute the tests of details and attend to red 
flags.
Sinn-m ary
This section has examined the literature and the theory 
relating to the effects of increasing levels of time pressure 
on the performance of audit procedures that require attention 
to red flags while executing tests of details. The following 
sections describe the design and results of an experiment in 
which time pressure was manipulated at levels that placed 
auditors beyond the peak of the inverted-U shaped curve 
relating arousal and performance. This experiment tests the 
prediction that increases in time pressure would have a more 
detrimental effect on the task of red flag detection than they 
would on the primary task of executing substantive tests. 
Such an effect could be attributed to the reduction of the 
range of attention under arousal as predicted by the 
Easterbrook hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS OF INQUIRY 
Research Approach 
The previous sections outlined the problem to be 
addressed in this dissertation, the reasons why such a problem 
should be addressed, and the results that would be expected to 
be obtained from such an investigation. This section will 
outline the method to be used to analyze the problem in 
accordance with the specifications of the previous sections. 
Included will be a discussion of why a controlled experiment 
was considered more appropriate for addressing this problem 
than the more common survey or field study approaches.
McDaniel [1988] documents the shortcomings of surveys and 
field studies in an analysis of the effects of time pressure 
on audit performance. The primary weakness of the survey 
method in this type of analysis is that there may not be a 
direct link between actual allocation of attentional resources 
and self-reported behaviors. The reallocation of attention 
under time pressure may be a passive and automatic process, or 
it may be an active coping response [Eysenck, 1982]. In 
either case, it is unlikely that self-reports would capture 
the narrowing of the range of attention under time pressure. 
If this reallocation of attention were passive, it is not 
likely that it would be reported by survey respondents simply 
because it would be unknown to them. When it is an active 
coping response, respondents may not be aware of its effects
44
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on performance. Presumably, if subjects were aware that their 
responses to time pressure were having the types of effects on 
audit quality that were detailed in the Treadway Commission's 
report they would not engage in them. As a result of these 
limitations, the survey approach is not likely to be an 
effective means of capturing the effects of time pressure on 
attention and performance.
A field study approach may also be inappropriate because 
it would be difficult to draw conclusions about the range of 
cues to which auditors attend without direct output measures 
of audit performance. Output measures of audit performance 
are not available on most audits as it is only in cases where 
audits are investigated that any indication of audit 
ineffectiveness may be detected [AICPA, 1978; McDaniel, 1988]. 
That is, an auditor's failure to identify a financial 
statement error may be realized only in instances where events 
subsequent to the conclusion of the audit lead to such actions 
as litigation alleging auditor negligence or peer review of 
audit procedures. In these instances it would be impossible 
to manipulate and difficult to measure the construct of time 
pressure. So, although the field study approach might 
maximize mundane realism or ecological validity, it would be 
impractical to gather enough data to conduct a meaningful 
analysis of the theoretical predictions discussed.
The preceding discussion indicates that an experimental 
approach may be most appropriate. The strength of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
experimental method is the level of internal validity that can 
be achieved with proper design. Because it is the presence of 
the psychological effect of a reduction in the range of 
attention under time pressure that is of interest, care must 
be exercised to ensure that the independent variable is being 
manipulated appropriately and that there are reliable measures 
of the variables of interest.
Subjects
Sixty-three auditors representing the offices of several 
different accounting firms in two different cities 
participated in the experiment. The size of the offices 
represented ranged from large Big Six offices to smaller 
offices of regional accounting firms that provide audit 
services. While conducting an experiment on such a diverse 
group presents certain threats to the internal validity of the 
experiment, the generalizability of the results to the entire 
population of auditors may be enhanced. The results most 
likely are not as sensitive to one particular firm's practices 
and training with respect to red flag detection. The threats 
to internal validity are related to the possibility that the 
experiment was administered several times at different 
locations. These threats were minimized through random 
assignment of participants to the time pressure treatment 
groups.
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Experimental Task
The primary concern in designing an experimental task to 
achieve a high level of internal validity is that the subj ects 
attend to independent variables. In this dissertation, such 
an effect would be achieved in large part if the subjects were 
to experience greater levels of time pressure as the time 
allotted to complete the task decreases, thus indicating that 
the construct of time pressure was being manipulated 
effectively.
Consideration of internal validity issues did not 
completely dominate the process of experimental task design. 
Because this study explicitly examines the context in which 
auditing occurs, particular attention was given to the mundane 
realism of the experimental task. As such, the experimental 
task was similar to those performed under time pressure by 
practitioners. Such an experimental task was developed by 
discussing audit procedures with practitioners, matching the 
task to the appropriate experience level of the subjects, and 
manipulating time pressure at levels normally experienced by 
practicing auditors.
McDaniel [1988, 1990] developed and employed such a task 
in an experimental analysis of time pressure on audit 
efficiency and effectiveness. In order to achieve a high 
level of task realism, attention was given to the design 
considerations noted above. The key to the appropriateness of 
the task, however, was its valid manipulation of time
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pressure. The data obtained from McDaniel's post-experimental 
questionnaire indicated that the subjects did, indeed, 
experience greater levels of time pressure as the amount of 
time allotted for the completion of the task decreased.
With some alteration of the data and instructions, the 
main features of McDaniel's task were used to address the 
research questions raised in the previous sections of this 
proposal. Because McDaniel's instrument was designed in 
accordance with the specifications outlined earlier, has been 
tested, and has been subjected to the scrutiny of peers, its 
use has most likely provided a more powerful analysis than the 
use of a completely original task would. McDaniel's study 
measured the effect of time pressure on the performance of a 
single task, however. In order to create a relevant second 
task and to make the auditors aware of their responsibilities 
for executing both tasks, McDaniel's experimental instrument 
was altered. Consistent with McDaniel's approach to task 
design and influenced by conversations with McDaniel, the 
alterations were incorporated based upon discussions with 
practitioners and the results of an extensive pretesting 
process.
An extensive pretesting process was undertaken in order 
to adapt McDaniel's instrument for the purposes of studying 
auditors' attention to red flags in a dual-task environment. 
An incremental approach to revisions was taken to avoid making 
unnecessary departures from McDaniel's task. As a result the
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instrument was pretested by auditors seven different times and 
twice by graduate students before it was considered 
appropriate for the research task. The pretesting process is 
described in Appendix B.
McDaniel's task was a test of details of inventory for a 
medium-sized manufacturing client. The participating auditors 
were given background information on the client and instructed 
to gather evidence to test the valuation and completeness 
assertions for finished goods inventory and inventory reserve. 
The tests to be performed were outlined in a partial year-end 
audit program.13 The data upon which these audit procedures 
were executed consisted of inventory and inventory reserve 
record prices and amounts for 25 products sold to each of the 
60 customers of a hypothetical audit client. The audit 
program detailed the sample size and the source of the data 
for each of the four tests of details. The auditors were 
instructed to indicate whether each item selected for 
investigation from the client's records was correctly reported 
in the records or reported erroneously based on criteria that 
were provided in the background materials. McDaniel chose 
this type of task because it is representative of what is 
typically performed under time pressure and because
13 McDaniel examined the individual and interactive 
effects of both time pressure and audit program structure on 
effectiveness and efficiency. This study examines the effects 
of time pressure using only the structured portion of 
McDaniel's task. As such, the task instructions would not 
need to be so general as to communicate objectives to auditors 
in both the structured and unstructured conditions.
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performance could be objectively measured. It is also well 
suited for this dissertation in that it involves the audit of 
inventory— the audit area most often associated with 
fraudulent financial reporting, as indicated by a recent 
survey of auditors who have encountered material 
irregularities in audits [Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham,
1989].
In administering the experiment, McDaniel imposed four 
different levels of time pressure on different groups of 
auditors. The measurements made by McDaniel were of the 
number of items examined for each of the tests and the 
accuracy with which they were examined. These measurements 
provided information on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
processing that were validated by the review process. 
McDaniel's task thus provides an important mechanism for 
establishing an output measure of performance on a validated 
audit test of details type of task.
As discussed in other sections of this dissertation, 
auditors are required to execute such tests of details as 
those prescribed in McDaniel's experimental task while being 
attentive to red flags. McDaniel's task did not address the 
dual nature of the auditor's role. The auditors executing 
McDaniel's single audit task were not required to perform any 
significant interpretation of the data processed.
The following three types of changes were made to 
McDaniel's instrument in order to adapt it to a dual-task
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structure: l) changes that made it clear to the participants
that they were responsible for being attentive to red flags in 
addition to executing detailed audit tests; 2) changes that 
indicate that red flags may be present; and, 3) changes that 
increased auditors' understanding of the mechanics and 
implications of client policies and procedures. A sample of 
the proposed experimental materials reflecting the results of 
all of the changes to McDaniel's test instrument is presented 
in Appendix C. The following discussion explains each of the 
three types of changes that were made.
Auditors1 Responsibilities 
Just as with McDaniel's task, the experiment involved the 
execution of tests of details of inventory records in 
accordance with instructions outlined in an audit program to 
achieve the audit objectives of evaluating completeness and 
valuation assertions. Unlike McDaniel's task, however, the 
participants were instructed that they were to be attentive to 
any indicators of possible irregularities present in the data 
and follow up on them just as they would in an actual audit 
situation. Statements emphasizing this point were disclosed 
in the task instructions, the statement of audit objectives, 
the audit program instructions, and the audit program. Some 
of these statements emphasized that attention to unusual items 
and possible irregularities is necessary to meet audit 
objectives. Others emphasized that this attentiveness needs 
to take place during the execution of all audit procedures.
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A third subset of these statements emphasized the importance 
of following up on unusual items noted and documenting them. 
Several practicing accountants at various levels of experience 
reviewed the wording of these statements and did not consider 
them to be inconsistent with audit responsibilities as they 
are communicated in practice.14
Seeding Red Flags 
In addition to the changes made to emphasize that the 
participating auditors are responsible for executing a dual 
role in this task just as they are in an actual audit 
situation, changes needed to be made to the task materials in 
order to seed red flags. These changes can be classified 
either 1) as statements indicating that the context in which 
the client is operating provides the incentive and opportunity 
for irregularities to occur or 2) as changes made to inventory 
and reserve data that, especially when analyzed in conjunction 
with the contextual factors present, indicate that there is a 
strong possibility that irregularities exist. The following 
discussion describes these contextual and data changes. 
Contextual Chances
The contextual changes to McDaniel's task were made to 
increase the level of professional skepticism with which the
14 These practicing auditors were not assessing whether 
or not the extent to which the task materials communicated the 
auditor's responsibility to detect irregularities was 
consistent with audit practice. The focus was on whether or 
not the terminology and wording and meaning was inconsistent 
with practice.
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auditors were to conduct the audit program tests. Because 
McDaniel studied a test of details type of task in which the 
auditors knew that they were not responsible for providing any 
significant interpretation of the results of the audit 
procedures applied, the main emphasis was on explaining the 
limited objectives to be achieved. In the revised task, 
however, the auditors were informed of the broader objectives 
of detecting, following up upon, and documenting any unusual 
circumstances noted with regard to the client. In order to 
induce the auditors to adopt an attitude of increased 
professional skepticism that would facilitate the attainment 
of these broader objectives, the contextual environment needed 
to communicate that such an attitude would be appropriate. 
Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham [1989] and SAS No. 53 
[AICPA, 1988] detail several conditions and motivating factors 
that increase the likelihood of material irregularities. 
Several of these factors were incorporated in a reasonable 
scenario for the client described in the task materials. They 
were communicated to the auditors through an excerpt from the 
audit planning memo regarding the client's operating 
environment.
Included in this excerpt were two types of statements. 
One type was designed to direct attention to the cues present 
in the data suggesting that the client may be engaged in 
irregularities. Examples of this type of statement include 
those that refer to and explain the implications of a lower
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aggregate inventory turnover ratio. The other type of 
statement was designed to indicate that the conditions (or 
opportunities) and motivating factors (or incentives) 
necessary for irregularities to surface are present. 
Statements indicating increased risk, increased competition, 
difficulty in retaining customers, a slowing-down of the 
movement of inventory, the presence of a financial statement 
based incentive plan, and the centralization of authority 
(communicated in the auditor's notes on the client's policy 
for valuing the reserve) should serve to increase the level of 
professional skepticism displayed by the auditors. All of 
these factors are consistent with the type of potential 
irregularities that were seeded in the task data, to be 
discussed next.
Task Data Changes
McDaniel's task data was altered in two significant ways 
to be appropriate for the study of the effects of time 
pressure on auditors' attention to red flags. First, the 
distribution of the client's customer sizes was changed 
somewhat. McDaniel's task involved customers of approximately 
equal sizes. This distribution was achieved by randomly 
selecting an integer between one and 1,000 for each average 
monthly usage value for each of the 25 products sold to each 
customer. The number of units on hand was generated by 
multiplying the average monthly use by a random number between 
zero and three (for items that were randomly selected to be
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overstocked, average monthly use was multiplied by a number 
between three and six). In the revised task, the customer 
sizes were altered to be more consistent with distributions 
that auditors may encounter in actual audit situations [as 
discussed in the Audit Sampling Guide, AICPA, 1992, AAG-SAM 
4.16]. The task contains five very large customers, 20 
moderately large customers, and 35 small customers. The 
reason for making this change is not just to add realism to 
the task, as a lack of realism did not appear to be a problem 
with McDaniel's task. Rather, the change in distribution was 
made to make the indicators irregularities seeded within the 
data more salient.
The potential irregularities follow from the consistent 
omission of overstocked items from the Reserve for Slow-Moving 
and Obsolete Inventory record for two very large customers. 
These are the only apparent material irregularities in the 
data. All of the other misstatements are more indicative of 
errors (i.e., they are mostly transposition errors and appear 
to be random in either direction). All of these types of 
errors will be seeded in accordance with the expected 
population error rates (based on previous audit experience 
with the client) reported in the task materials. Although the 
seeding rate of omissions from the reserve record is different 
from that reported in the materials and by McDaniel, the 
policy for valuing the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Overstocked 
Inventory is the same. This policy explains that the client
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being audited must record an entry for each item whose units 
on hand exceeds three times the average monthly usage 
(quantities that are both reported in the finished goods 
record). The amount of this entry is given by the excess 
units (i.e. the number of items in excess of three months 
usage) taken at the item's current unit cost. The total in 
the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory Record is 
subtracted from the total in the Finished Goods Inventory 
Record to arrive at a final inventory valuation.
The average customer (excluding the two customers with 
consistent omissions) has around four out of 25 products whose 
quantity on hand exceeds three times the average monthly 
usage. Across all of these customers, all but three percent 
of these items are properly reported on the reserve record. 
For the two very large customers with consistent omissions 
from the reserve record (hereafter referred to as the "red 
flag" customers), the quantity on hand exceeds three times the 
average monthly usage for all of the 25 products. These two 
customers have an average number of items (around four) 
reported on the reserve record, however. Given the client's 
policy, these reserve item omissions have the effect of 
overstating inventory and net income. The number and pattern 
of these omissions, coupled with the other contextual 
information discussed earlier, indicate that there is an 
increased likelihood that the client is perhaps seeking to 
cover-up the loss of two very large customers.
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The systematic nature of the omissions, coupled with the 
fact that a normal number of products are listed in the 
reserve for these two "red flag" customers, decreases the 
likelihood that the omissions are due to unintentional 
oversight. Given the information in the task materials 
regarding the policy for valuing the reserve (e.g., that the 
policy is well established in the industry and that deviations 
from the policy would impair the comparability of the client’s 
financial statements with those of its peers), it is unlikely 
that any intentional omission of items would be justifiable. 
Even if the auditor did believe that they could be justified, 
the matter would warrant documentation as an additional item 
for supervisory attention. Auditing standards in two major 
areas provide support for the contention that, even though the 
implications of such a situation are not completely clear, the 
situation should be attended to and documented by auditors. 
The following discussion outlines the authoritative guidance 
on this matter.
The first source of guidance pertains to the 
consideration of errors and irregularities. The systematic 
nature of underreporting of excess inventory build-up of all 
products sold to a few, key customers could be indicative of 
either a management misinterpretation of the Inventory Reserve 
policy, or an attempt to conceal the loss of key customers. 
The former situation would constitute an error, the latter an 
irregularity. The data presented in the instrument would not
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be sufficient to draw a clear conclusion as to whether the
misstatement is intentional or not. As such, it would be
inappropriate to dismiss the situation without appropriately
documenting it for further review.15 Auditing standards are
quite clear in asserting the importance of fully investigating
causes and effects of misstatements such as those proposed to
be seeded in the data:
The auditor should evaluate the significance of 
differences between the accounting records and the 
underlying facts and circumstances detected by the 
application of auditing procedures. The auditor should 
consider both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
these matters and whether they are indicative of an error 
or irregularity. Often a particular matter considered in 
isolation cannot be identified as an error or 
irregularity; nevertheless, this evaluation is important. 
Because irregularities are intentional, they have 
implications beyond their direct monetary effect and the 
auditor needs to consider the implications for other 
aspects of the audit. [AICPA, 1992, AU 316.22]
The second source of guidance pertains to the
consideration of the entity's ability to continue as a going
concern. Although the source of the misstatements of the
inventory reserve listing will be unknown to the participants
in the study, one conclusion that cannot be ruled out is that
the misstatements are an attempt to conceal the loss of key
customers. Because the loss of a key customer is a situation
that— especially when combined with other negative conditions
and events— may signal the need to consider the entity's
15 The auditors will be expected to document any errors 
that are noted. As a result, failure to document any 
situation which appears unusual could be considered to be 
representative of audit ineffectiveness.
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ability to continue as a going concern [AICPA, 1992, AU 
341.06], the situation should be noted and considered for 
further investigation. The participants in the proposed 
experiment will be executing their procedures without any 
information on other audit areas. While they will not be able 
to consider the interactive effects of conditions and events 
noted in other portions of the audit, they will be encouraged 
to report any conditions noted in this area so such 
considerations could be made.
These two areas of authoritative guidance indicate that 
misstatements of the type seeded in the experimental data 
should be documented if the subjects devote enough attention 
to them to understand their implications. Because the 
instructions clearly state that any unusual items should be 
documented in the space provided, the documentation provided 
by the auditors should serve as a measure of the attention 
given to these cues. Neglecting to devote attention to these 
items and document them would be indicative of audit 
ineffectiveness. The presence and extent of documentation of 
these misstatements would then constitute output measures of 
performance that would be indicative of the extent to which 
attention is paid to subsidiary task-related stimuli. 
McDaniel's audit effectiveness score applied to the results of 
the tests of details should measure the attention devoted to 
the primary task. These measures of performance and attention 
will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.
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Client Policy and Procedure Clarification
Because of the broader audit objectives facing the 
participants in this study as opposed to McDaniel's study, 
changes that promoted a greater understanding of the mechanics 
and implications of the client's policies and procedures were 
necessary. The broader audit objectives were put in place to 
encourage auditors to give more attention to unusual items and 
relationships. The process of pretesting the test instrument 
revealed that auditors were attending to and investigating 
unusual relationships, but that some of the items that the 
auditors were investigating were unrelated to the 
irregularities seeded in the data. Often these investigations 
were based on suppositions made about information that was 
confusing to the auditors. Clarifying information was added 
to the materials to keep subsequent auditors from pursuing 
these "dead end" or misleading investigations. Specific 
examples of these changes are detailed in the discussion 
below.
First, the number of items for which there were zero 
units reported in the Finished Goods Inventory Record when in 
fact there were units on hand caused several pretest auditors 
to make fruitless investigations. This type of error has 
little basis in reality. It was appropriate in McDaniel's 
task because the auditors were not required to understand the 
implications of the errors that were encountered. In the 
proposed task, however, the auditors were attempting to
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explain those items for which no reasonable explanation 
existed. For this reason, the seeding rate for these items 
was reduced from 8% to 1%, also resulting in a reduction in 
the number of items required to be sampled in the inventory 
test count (from 60 to 25 per Audit Sampling Guide, AICPA, 
1992, AAG-SAM APP A]). Because this reduced the amount of 
audit procedures required to be executed, the amount of time 
allotted for the completion of the task was adjusted 
accordingly.16
Also misleading to the auditors was the client's policy 
for valuing the Inventory Reserve (as it was titled in 
McDaniel's task). Because several auditors did not realize 
that a failure to disclose an item on this reserve record 
resulted in an overstatement of inventory and net income, the 
name of the record was changed and a section entitled 
"Auditor's Notes on Client Policy" was added. The name of the 
record was changed to the "Reserve for Slow-Moving and 
Obsolete Inventory" to more accurately reflect the nature of 
the items to be included. A sample journal entry that clearly
16 This adjustment was made by dividing the number of 
processing items eliminated with this adjustment (35) by the 
average number of items processed per minute (2.75) for the 
subjects in McDaniel's study [1988, p. 58]. The result (12.7 
minutes) represented an estimate of the amount of time 
eliminated from the task by reducing the required sample size 
of the finished goods omission step. The additional time 
required for increased responsibilities and the time required 
to induce a lower level of time pressure were also factored 
into the decision on the total time allotment. These factors 
were estimated to require approximately the same amount of 
time as was eliminated by reducing the sample size.
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showed how the omission of items from the record would affect 
assets and net income was also given. Because several pretest 
auditors believed that excessive omissions from this record 
may be indicative of an inappropriate policy rather than a 
reporting problem, a statement was added that established the 
policy as an accepted industry standard. These changes made 
the implications of omissions from the reserve record less 
ambiguous. Auditors who attended to this information should 
have realized that such omissions are indicative of a 
departure from generally accepted accounting principles. 
Appendix D summarizes the differences between McDaniel's test 
instrument and the test instrument used for this study.
Design
Having outlined the experimental task proposed to analyze 
the effects of time pressure on attentional processes of 
auditors, the remainder of this section will detail the design 
considerations. Key topics in this section include the 
manipulation of the independent variable and the measurement 
of the dependent variables. Some of the content of the post- 
experimental questionnaire will also be discussed in this 
section.
As detailed in the previous sections, the literature on 
the effects of arousal predicts a narrowing of the range of 
attention under time pressure. Under conditions of time 
pressure, attention should become more focused on the data 
associated with the primary task of execution of the detailed
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tests outlined in the audit program. This focusing is likely 
to come at the expense of the type of attention that permits 
the processing of meaning associated with data related to the 
subsidiary task of reviewing listings for quantities and 
amounts that appear unusual. Because individuals under time 
pressure are less likely to devote attention to the data at a 
level that facilitates the processing of the ecological 
properties (or meaning) of the stimulus, it is predicted that 
they will be less likely to detect and document the excess 
inventory build-up and Inventory Reserve omissions. Further, 
because of the findings of studies investigating the effects 
of arousal on dual-task performance, it is predicted that the 
decline in the performance of this subsidiary task will 
precede the decline in performance of the test of details.
Independent Variable 
Time pressure, the independent variable manipulated in 
this experiment, was operationalized by restricting the time 
allowed for completion of the task. This method is consistent 
with the approaches of McDaniel and Waggoner and Cashell 
[1991]. The levels of time pressure imposed on the 
participants included positions on either side of the apex of 
the inverted-U shaped curve relating stress and performance. 
By allowing the participants in the four treatment groups 75, 
65, 55, and 45 minutes to complete the experimental task, the 
desired range was likely to be achieved. These times are 
based upon both the results of McDaniel's experiment involving
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a very similar task given to 22 pilot study participants and 
90 practitioners and extensive pretesting of the proposed
task. McDaniel's experimental groups were allotted 75, 65,
55, and 45 minutes to complete the task. In the lowest time 
pressure group ( 75 minutes) in McDaniel's task, participants 
used, on average, 86 percent of the time allotted for the
task. In the 65, 55, and 45 minute time budget conditions,
the respective averages of time used were 94, 96, and 99 
percent of the allotted time. McDaniel's task required 
auditors to execute the detailed tests on more sample items 
than is the case in this task. As a result, imposing the same 
time constraints should have resulted in slightly less time 
pressure being experienced.
The reason that lower time pressure conditions were 
included is that performance of the subsidiary task (red flag 
detection) is predicted by psychology literature to be 
affected by increased arousal prior to the performance of the 
primary task (the tests of details). McDaniel, in order to 
examine the effects of time pressure on only the test of 
details performance, imposed time pressure at a level where 
test of details performance was impaired.17 Because the focus 
of this study was on the tasks that are hypothesized to be 
affected before the primary task of executing audit tests of 
details, time pressure was imposed at lower levels than in
17 McDaniel also examined the effect of another 
independent variable, audit program structure, and the two 
variables' interactive effect on test of details performance.
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McDaniel's study. This study analyzes whether or not the task 
of red flag detection is affected at time pressure levels 
where performance of the test of details task is not affected. 
The measurements used to conduct such an analysis are detailed 
below.
Dependent Variables 
Test of Details Performance
The measurement of effectiveness and efficiency of the 
test of details task performance, or primary task performance, 
is consistent with the model presented by McDaniel [1988,
1990] as described below. Audit effectiveness (denoted Y,) is 
measured as the sum of the four individual audit effectiveness 
scores (Yu) relating to each of the audit program steps, and 
is calculated as follows:
Yi = (Si=M(YH)), where
= ([(î  - eiJ/nJ x 100) x to/iO , 
where
nj = the number of items examined in procedure i, i = 1 
- 4,
e} = the number of auditor errors (i.e., incorrect 
rejections or incorrect acceptances) made in 
applying procedure i to each of the nj items 
selected,
ni*= the sample size necessary to achieve the audit 
objective for procedure i.
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As indicated above, the effectiveness score for each 
procedure is based upon 1) the number of items examined in the 
execution of the given audit program step, 2) the number of 
errors made in performing the audit program step, and 3) the 
sample size required by the audit program step. The first two 
factors are measurements obtained from participant 
documentation of activity. The third factor, the sample size 
required by the audit program step, is the number required to 
achieve the audit objective of obtaining 90 percent confidence 
that the true error rate for each error type does not exceed 
the tolerable error rate of 15 percent. Consistent with 
McDaniel's task, the sample size is that required to achieve 
the stated objective using a single stage fixed sampling plan 
[AICPA, 1983, p. 107]. Contrary to McDaniel's measurement, 
the participants will not be able to increase their audit 
effectiveness scores for this test of details task by 
examining more items than are required by the audit program. 
This condition ensures that the maximum score that could be 
achieved for each of the procedures requiring sampling is 100. 
This score would be attained if participants correctly process 
at least as many items as are required by each audit program 
step. The maximum score, then, is 400 (resulting from scores 
of 100 on each of the four procedures to be scored in this 
manner).
The overall audit effectiveness score is a product of 
components that McDaniel labels (1) nonsampling processing
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accuracy ([(r̂  - e;)/nj x 100) and (2) achieved sampling 
adequacy (n n̂/) . The accuracy component may be of particular 
interest in identifying how well the procedures were performed 
independently of whether or not the procedure was actually 
completed. This analysis may lend insight into whether any 
performance decrements are a product of inadequate processing 
or merely an inability to complete the assigned procedures. 
Performance decrements associated with the inability to 
complete the audit procedures are not as interesting to this 
study except to the extent that the inability to complete the 
procedures may have been caused by slower processing under 
time pressure.18 
Red Flag Detection Performance
Subsidiary task performance is related to the auditors' 
ability to detect and analyze the red flags present in the 
task. Recall that it was asserted that there are two ways in 
which the narrowing of attention under stress may manifest 
itself with respect to subsidiary task performance (discussed 
in section II.3.). It may be simply that fewer cues are 
attended to under time pressure, or it may be that fewer cues 
will be attended to at a level that permits the processing of 
their ecological properties. Several different methods of
18 As detailed in the analysis, there were performance 
decrements associated with an inability to complete assigned 
audit procedures. Further analysis revealed that auditors 
under pressure did not appear to execute procedures more 
slowly. This finding lends importance to the accuracy 
component as a measure of test of details task performance.
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eliciting auditor responses have been incorporated into the 
task to measure the extent to which each of these effects 
occurs. The remainder of this chapter details these methods 
and the results obtained.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the red flags in 
this task are grounded in the incentives and opportunities 
described in the contextual environment as well as the data 
for the two "red flag" customers with unreported overstocks of 
inventory. While it is important for the auditor to recognize 
the incentives and opportunities in order to operate with an 
increased level of professional skepticism and to generate 
hypotheses about the nature of any irregularities that are 
detected, the main measure of performance of the subsidiary 
task is the extent to which the auditor recognizes the 
irregularities present in the data. As such, measurement of 
the extent to which auditors in each time pressure group 
attend to the data for the two "red flag" customers is central 
to the analysis of subsidiary task performance.
Measurement data was gathered from two main sources— the 
additional documentation and written comments provided by the 
auditors and the assessments made on a questionnaire 
administered at several intervals during the experiment. Both 
of these measurement sources will be outlined below.
First, the additional documentation provided by the 
auditors was analyzed and classified according to the extent 
to which the subjects noted the discrepancies in the records
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for the two "red flag" customers. Each set of experimental 
materials was reviewed for indications that the auditor 
attended to the situation involving the two customers. Three 
different classifications that examine progressively deeper 
levels of processing were made.
The first such classification was designed to be the most 
sensitive to any indication that the auditor attended to any 
aspect of the situation involving the misstated customers. 
Each set of materials was thoroughly reviewed for any 
indication that the auditor noted that one (or both) of these 
customers was (were) different in any way from the others. 
The emphasis was on detecting any relevant marks made outside 
of the normal documentation of the detailed tests (e.g., 
circling of the inventory turnover ratio— which is
exceptionally low— or the units on hand total— which is 
exceptionally high for the affected customers, extra
calculations not associated with the tests of details for 
these customers, any notation of the need to investigate 
anything with regard to these customers). For the purposes of 
this measurement, any set of materials with any such relevant 
notations was classified as "detected.N Any set without such 
notations was classified as "not detected."
The second classification was designed to capture a
slightly deeper level of processing of the cues indicating the 
presence of irregularities. For an item to have been
classified as "detected" with this measurement, there had to
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have been some indication that the auditor realized that 
several items relative to one of the two "red rlag" customers 
were left off the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete 
Inventory record and/or proposed an adjustment to correct the 
misstatement. Auditor documentation in this case needs to be 
more complete than it would with the first classification 
(e.g., several "X"s— indicating an error— in the "Reserve Item 
Omission" column of the task materials, preliminary 
calculations of the understatement of the reserve, or a note 
that an adjustment to the reserve would have to be made).
The final classification was made based on indications 
that the auditor considered some of management's incentives 
and opportunities to provide materially misleading financial 
statements. The analysis for this classification considered 
whether or not the auditor attempted to generate hypotheses as 
to how or why the misstatement was made and to what extent the 
financial statements are misstated (e.g., recognition of the 
incentives related to financial statement based compensation 
plans, increased competition, decreased profitability, the 
possible loss of major customers that could lead to going 
concern problems, the recognition of opportunities related to 
corporate diversity and divisional autonomy, top management 
involvement in routine inventory obsolescence entries, 
inappropriate audit procedures that failed to audit average 
monthly usage figures for the fourth quarter when conditions 
had changed). Again, if any of these considerations were
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incorporated into a given auditor's analysis, it was 
classified as "detected." Those who do not progress to this 
level of understanding of the situation were classified as 
"not detected."
The second major type of measurement data comes from 
several, identical questionnaires that were administered at 
the 15 minute mark of the experiment and at ten minute 
intervals thereafter. A copy of this questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix E. These questionnaires asked auditors 
to assess the likelihood of material misstatement arising from 
each of the four types of errors seeded in the data and to 
assess the likelihood that material irregularities and/or 
financial fraud are present. This measurement was designed to 
provide information about the level of understanding obtained 
by the auditors as well. Those who did not indicate that 
there is a relatively high likelihood of misstatement due to 
omission of items from the reserve probably did not attend to 
the cues present in the data. Those who indicated that there 
is a relatively high likelihood of misstatement due to 
omission of items from the reserve but did not assess a high 
likelihood of irregularities or financial fraud probably did 
detect the omission of items from the reserve but did not 
assimilate the other red flags into the analysis. Those who 
assessed a relatively high likelihood to all three situations 
have probably attended to the indicators at a level that 
yields an understanding of their implications.
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The reason that the questionnaires were given at the 15, 
25, 35, 45, 55, 65, and 75 minute marks is that it enabled 
analysis of all of the different time pressure groups at the 
same point in time as well as at the end of the allotted time. 
While the frequent administration of the questionnaires 
allowed for measurements to be taken during the task, they may 
have increased the artificiality of the experimental 
environment. In addition, they may have induced the auditors 
to give greater attention to indicators of potential 
irregularities and financial fraud. These threats to the 
validity of the experiment may have been reduced since the 
questionnaires were given with the same frequency to each of 
the treatment groups.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND SUMMARY 
Data Analysis 
Administration of the Experiment 
The experiment was administered at five locations in 
November and December, 1993. Although the time between the 
separate administrations of the experiment provided the 
opportunity for history effects19 to threaten the internal 
validity of the experiment [Cook and Campbell, 1979], measures 
were taken to minimize any such effects that might be 
realized. One of these measures was the way in which the 
experimental materials were ordered and distributed. There 
were four different time pressure conditions and four 
different versions of the experimental materials. The fourth 
version of the 65 minute time pressure condition was selected 
at random as the first set of materials to be distributed. 
The remainder of the experimental packets were systematically 
ordered thereafter with the fourth version of the 75 minute 
condition next, the fourth version of the 45 minute condition 
after that, and the fourth version of the 55 minute condition 
after that. The third version of the 65 minute condition was 
next and the others followed the same order. The packets were 
then distributed, in this order, to the auditors as they 
arrived at the site, thus ensuring that virtually the same
19 History effects may occur when an observed effect may 
be attributable to events which occur in the time period 
between tests.
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
number of subjects would be assigned to each treatment 
condition at each administration site. By distributing the 
packets equally across treatment conditions, the firm effect 
and the history effect on results should have been minimized.
At each location, upon arrival the auditors were given an 
envelope containing experimental materials and were directed 
to take a seat in one of four areas of the room depending on 
the treatment condition assigned.20 They were instructed to 
keep the envelope closed until they were given instructions to 
begin working. After they were seated, they were given the 
task instructions. These instructions were read aloud 
verbatim. Afterward, they were shown the timer that they 
should use to document the time taken on the task and were 
informed that an audit program in the experimental materials 
would indicate the total time allotted for the task. They 
were told that the materials differed among auditors and that 
they should be concerned only with the progress of their own 
work. Finally, they were instructed that they would be asked 
to complete a questionnaire every ten minutes and that time 
had been allotted in the audit program to respond fully to it. 
Following these instructions, they were told to open their 
packets and begin working on the assigned task. The final
20 Although tighter control could have been exercised by 
segregating the treatment groups into two or four rooms, the 
one-room method did not appear to affect the results 
significantly. Interviews with participants indicated that 
they were generally unaware of the different completion times 
and were unaffected by the activities of other participants.
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questionnaire given to each auditor in each participant group 
contained instructions to stop working, assemble the 
materials, and to place them in the envelope. They were given 
a post-experimental questionnaire and were instructed to 
complete it without referring to the experimental materials.
Of the 63 subjects, all but one completed the task 
satisfactorily. The one subject's materials were invalidated 
when he reopened his experimental materials and began marking 
on them after reading some of the questions on the post- 
experimental questionnaire.
Of the 62 remaining subjects, nine had less than one year 
of experience and three had over six years of experience. 
Because the task in the experimental materials was designed 
for individuals at the one year experience level or higher 
[McDaniel, 1990], and because the auditors were instructed to 
execute their assigned responsibilities as they would in a 
normal audit situation, individuals with less than one year of 
experience were excluded from the analysis. The auditors with 
over six years of experience were also excluded from the 
analysis based on the fact that at this level they have 
reduced responsibility for executing tests of details as 
designed in the experimental task. As a result, the final 
sample sizes were 14, 15, 11, and 10 for the 45, 55, 65, and 
75 minute conditions, respectively. Interestingly, the random 
assignment of experimental materials produced a situation 
where all nine of the individuals with less than one year of
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experience and all three of those with greater than six years 
of experience were assigned to the 65 and 75 minute 
conditions. Subsequent analyses exclude these subjects. 
Although the analysis to be reported in the following sections 
uses the reduced sample— that which excludes the nine auditors 
with less than one year of experience and the three auditors 
with more than six years of experience— each of these 
statistical tests was conducted on the full sample as well. 
In no case did the results of these tests produce a conclusion 
different from that obtained using the reduced sample 
(assuming an alpha level of .05). Table 1 presents the 
demographic data for the total sample and the sample upon 
which the analysis was conducted. There were no significant 
differences between treatment groups on any of these 
demographic items.
Manipulation Checks 
In order to assess the successful manipulation of the 
construct of time pressure, manipulation checks of the 
independent variable were included in the post-experimental 
questionnaire. Consistent with McDaniel, the participants 
were asked "How much time pressure did you actually feel 
during the inventory exercise?" and "On average, how much time 
pressure do you feel in your daily work?" The participants 
were asked to respond on a seven-point scale with 1 
representing "very little time pressure" and 7 representing 
"substantial time pressure." The means of the responses to









Number of subjects 62 50 6
Months of public 
accounting experience
35.45 31.28 34.50
Age 26.86 26.62 25.33
Number of engagements 
providing experience with 
inventory testing
10.61 6.92 8.67
Number of subjects with 
Master's degree
5 4 1
Number of subjects 
previously involved in an 
audit in which the client 
had engaged in financial 
fraud
3 1 0
Number of subjects 
previously involved in an 
audit in which the client 
had a material 
irregularity
13 11 1
* "Detected" column contains information for those who 
were classified as detected under the first measure of 
subsidiary task performance because they documented 
anything unusual about the two "red flag" customers.
the first question are expected to increase with increasing 
levels of time pressure. The means of the responses to the 
second question should have been constant across all treatment 
groups.
Based on McDaniel's findings, it is expected that 
auditors generally will indicate that they experience more 
time pressure on the job than they did during the experiment
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and that the difference should decrease as the time allotted 
for completion of the task decreases. To the extent that 
auditors with more than one year of experience generally have 
been exposed to similar time constraints in their daily work, 
the measurement of the difference in reported levels of time 
pressure may provide a better measurement than the direct 
question on the amount of time pressure actually experienced.
Although the mean level of time pressure actually 
experienced in completing the experiment increased, as 
expected, with decreases in the time allotted, the one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that the effect was not 
statistically significant (p ^ .37). Additionally, the
difference between the mean of the reported level of time 
pressure experienced by those in the 45 minute group (4.21) 
was not significantly different from that of the 75 minute 
group (3.30) (t(df„2Z) =1.03, p £ .31). Similar findings were 
obtained using the measurement of the difference of time 
pressure experienced during the experiment and in daily work. 
The ANOVA indicated that the manipulated level of time 
pressure did not produce a statistically significant effect in 
the differences between experimental and daily work related 
time pressure (p £ .20). The mean difference in time pressure 
for the 45 minute group (-0.36) was not significantly 
different from that of the 75 minute group (-2.00) (t^.aj = 
1.66, p < .11). These results indicate that it would be 
inappropriate to conclude that the independent variable of
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time pressure was appropriately manipulated between the four 
groups. As a result, an analysis was undertaken to determine 
which groups experienced significantly different levels of 
time pressure.
A post hoc analysis of the responses to the experienced 
level of time pressure revealed that the greatest difference 
was found between the 55- and 65-minute time pressure 
conditions. This result was consistent with pretest findings 
indicating that the mechanical execution of the procedures 
took about 45 minutes and the reading of the materials took 
about ten minutes. It was also consistent with the result 
reported by McDaniel [1988, p.58] that subjects averaged 
between 2.6 and 2.9 items processed per minute. Given that 
auditors were asked to process 150 items in the dissertation 
instrument, the execution of the task should have taken 
between 58 and 52 minutes. Because of this apparent dichotomy 
and the lack of significance of the results when analyzed 
across four groups, an analysis of time pressure was repeated 
on the data when the 45- and 55-minute conditions were 
consolidated into one "highH time pressure condition, and the 
65- and 75-minute groups were consolidated into one "low" time 
pressure condition.
When the subjects are classified in this way, the mean 
difference between the level of time pressure experienced 
during the experiment and the time pressure experienced in 
daily work for the high time pressure group (-0.28) was
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group (-1.80) (t(dX=47) = 2.21, p £ 0.032). As discussed
previously, the key to the design of an experiment is the 
valid manipulation of the independent variable. In this 
experiment, the conclusion that the subjects experienced a 
greater amount of time pressure as the time allotted was 
decreased is valid only when the data are aggregated into two 
groups and measured by the difference metric described above. 
As a result, all subsequent statistical analyses will be 
conducted only on the aggregated data. Consistent with 
McDaniel's findings and my expectations, the mean reported 
level of time pressure experienced in daily work for the high 
time pressure group (4.58) was not significantly different 
from that of the low time pressure group (5.00) (t(df=47) = -
0.96, p < 0.341), suggesting a homogeneous sample.
Test of Details Performance 
Having explained the manipulation of the independent 
variable, the discussion now shifts to the results associated 
with the dependent variables. Test of details effectiveness, 
or the output measure associated with what was theorized to be 
the primary task, was a function of processing accuracy and 
sampling adequacy. While the overall measure of test of 
details effectiveness for the high time pressure group 
(354.85) was significantly lower than that of the low time 
pressure group (380.57) (t(if>s4#) = -2.20, p £ 0.033), it is
unclear as to whether the difference is a result of an actual
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decline in the proficiency with which audit tests were 
executed or rather a result of truncated procedures. That is, 
the test of details effectiveness measure may be over­
sensitive to the truncation of procedures due to time 
constraints. It is possible that auditors under high time 
pressure were executing procedures with equal speed and 
accuracy but were simply cut short by the time constraint. In 
this case, despite the lower overall effectiveness score, it 
may not be appropriate to conclude that they achieved a lower 
level of performance on the test of details task. The self- 
reports of time taken to complete each of the audit steps 
helps to illuminate this issue.
This issue arises because the self-reported average time 
taken to complete the task for the low time pressure group was 
over 58 minutes— well in excess of the time allotted for the 
high time pressure group. In addition, analysis of self- 
reports, detailed in Table 2, indicated that 15 out of 29 
subjects under high time pressure did not report a time for 
the completion of all of the audit steps. The corresponding 
ratio in the low time pressure group was four out of 21. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the self-reported time taken to 
complete all but the last of the assigned procedures revealed 
that the mean total time reported for the high time pressure 
group (36.81 minutes) was significantly lower than the mean 
for the low time pressure group (44.68) (t( d f = -3.60, p £
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0.002).21 These results indicate that the lower audit 
effectiveness scores for the high time pressure group, while 
most likely due to the inability of the auditors to complete 
all of the assigned procedures, are not a result of slower 
processing. In fact, the self-reports indicated that those 
under high time pressure executed the first three procedures 
faster than those under low time pressure.22
Table 2






















45 14 6 44.2 (n=6) 33.6 (n=13)
55 15 8 51.1 (n=8) 40.0 (n=13)
65 11 8 55.1 (n=8) 43.0 (n=10)
75 10 9 61.6 (n=9) 46.6 (n=9)
Total/Avg 50 31 53.84 (n=31) 40.1 (n=45)
21 Because Levene's test for equality of variances was 
significant (F = 4.25, p =< 0.045), the separate variance t 
test is reported here. The pooled variance t test was 
virtually identical. Six auditors, three in each group, were 
excluded from the analysis because they did not self-report 
the time spent on all of the steps included in the analysis.
22 Because most of those who ran out of time failed to 
complete the final assigned procedure, self reports were not 
available over all four steps for all auditors.
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It appears then that significant difference in the 
overall audit effectiveness scores observed between groups may 
not be the result of decreased efficiency in the execution of 
the tests of details but rather the result of a truncation of 
the execution of the procedures induced by the time 
constraint. The following analysis examines the processing 
accuracy component of the effectiveness score to identify 
whether the lower effectiveness scores are due to lower 
accuracy or simply uncompleted procedures.
As the measure of audit effectiveness can be broken down 
into an accuracy component and a sampling component, it may be 
appropriate to consider the accuracy component as a measure of 
the proficiency with which the actual audit test of details 
task is executed. Recall that the measure of accuracy is the 
ratio of correctly processed items to total items processed 
times 100 for each audit procedure. As a result, a score of 
400 is again the maximum score that may be attained. 
Theoretically, this score could be attained by processing only 
one item (correctly) for each of the four procedures for which 
documentation was required.23 To ensure that the results 
would not be biased by such an approach, the data were 
examined to determine if any subject appeared to be operating
23 A fifth audit program step, that of reviewing the 
records for items, products, amounts, and customers that 
appear unusual was also included on the audit program. 
Because this step is primarily associated with what has been 
theorized to be the subsidiary task, red flag detection, this 
step is not referred to in this portion of the analysis.
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with such a strategy. All subjects appeared to review the 
materials and attempt to complete at least three of the test 
of details procedures. Apparently nine subjects were unable 
to fully complete one of the four procedures. All of these 
subjects apparently attempted to complete the other three 
steps. Three subjects were excluded from the analysis because 
they did not provide any documentation for one of the audit 
steps.24 The results of the pooled-variance t-test indicated 
that there was no significant difference in the mean level of 
accuracy between the high (397.11) and the low (398.47) time 
pressure groups (t(df=4S) = -1.15, p < 0.257). Because Levene's 
test for equality of variances was marginally significant (F 
= 3.336, p < 0.074) a separate-variance t-test was also run. 
The results similarly indicated that there was no significant 
difference between the two groups (t(df=4262) = 1.20, p < 0.235). 
These results depart from McDaniel's finding that processing 
accuracy decreased significantly from low to high time 
pressure among subjects who attempted to execute procedures in 
accordance with an audit program. Recall that this study
24 The measure of accuracy requires the division of the 
number correctly processed by the total number processed for 
each step. The accuracy score could not be computed for those 
who did not process any items for one of the steps because it 
would create a situation where the denominator was zero. The 
analysis was also run by calculating an accuracy score where 
the totals were aggregated, thus eliminating the division by 
zero situation. The results under this analysis were not 
significantly different from the results reported in the text. 
The former method was reported in the text to be consistent 
with the measurements provided by McDaniel.
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intended to manipulate time pressure at a lower level than did 
McDaniel's. It is possible that time pressure was manipulated 
at a level where accuracy was not affected as greatly.
A separate analysis of the overall test of details 
effectiveness scores was run on only those individuals who 
essentially completed all of the audit program steps upon 
which the score was based. This test redefines accuracy as 
processing without error and processing the assigned number of 
items. That is, it considers both errors of commission and 
errors of omission (e.g., a subject who processes 72 out of 75 
assigned items with one mistake in processing would be 
classified as having made four errors under this measurement 
as opposed to one error under the previously reported 
measurement). It removes from the analysis those who simply 
did not get close— defined as within ten inventory count, 
reserve, or pricing items of the number assigned— to 
completing one or more steps.25 The mean of the test of 
details effectiveness scores for the high time pressure group 
(393.80, n = 14) was not significantly different from the mean 
of the test of details effectiveness scores for the low time
25 The cut-off point of ten items was selected because it 
allows for auditor miscounts of the number of items selected. 
For example, it is possible that the auditor would examine 73 
items for a procedure in which 75 was the assigned number. In 
this case, the explanation that the auditor simply miscounted 
the number of items selected is more likely than the 
explanation that the auditor failed to complete the procedure. 
The analysis was performed using a cut-off point of five items 
with very similar results.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
pressure group (395.21, n = 17) (t(df=29) — -0.55, p < 0.589).
As would be expected, this analysis excluded more individuals 
from the high time pressure condition (15) than it did from 
the low time pressure condition (4).
Table 3 summarizes the major hypotheses tested relative 
to the test of details task, the a priori expectations, the 
results obtained, and the overall level of significance of the 
t-tests. Taken as a whole, these results appear to indicate 
that time pressure was imposed at a level that did not 
significantly affect the manner in which the test of details 
were performed. Time pressure, as it was operationalized in 
this task, appeared to affect the extent to which auditors 
completed the task but not the level of accuracy with which 
items were processed.
Table 3
Hypotheses, Results, and Significance Levels 
for Tests of Details Performance
Research hypothesis Result p-value
H., There will be no difference in the test of details effectiveness 
scores for the low and high time 
pressure groups.
difference p<0.024
There will be no difference in the 
test of details accuracy scores 





Among those who essentially 
completed all assigned audit 
steps, there will be no difference 
in test of details effectiveness 
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While these results may appear to conflict with the 
results presented by McDaniel, the apparent inconsistency may 
be resolved when one recognizes that this study did not 
attempt to replicate McDaniel's results. The dissertation 
test instrument was based upon McDaniel's, but the changes 
that were made to the instrument and the differing goals with 
regard to the manipulation of the independent variable of time 
pressure precluded the replication of results. The changes 
made to the test instrument were discussed in a previous 
section. The differences in the manipulation of the 
independent variable are discussed below.
McDaniel examined the effects of time pressure on the 
single cognitive task of executing tests of details. This 
study examined the effects of time pressure in a dual 
cognitive task environment in which the execution of auditing 
tests of details was the primary task and the detection of red 
flags was the subsidiary task. The theory predicted that as 
time pressure increased, attentional resources would be 
diverted from the task of attending to red flags to the test 
of details task. Thus, the prediction was made that auditors 
under high time pressure would suffer performance decrements, 
relative to the low time pressure group, on the task of 
attending to red flags but would not show a decline in 
performance on the test of details task. In order to observe 
this effect, time pressure needed to be manipulated at levels 
where performance decrements on the test of details task were
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not expected to occur. McDaniel's intended manipulation of 
time pressure was designed to include levels at which the test 
of details task was affected, however. Alternatively stated, 
while McDaniel expected to find a decline in performance for 
the high time pressure group, this study did not.26 The 
results presented above are consistent with those 
expectations.
While this explanation is intuitively appealing, it may 
not fully explain the observed results. The conclusion that 
time pressure was manipulated at a lower level in this study, 
thus not producing the negative effects on test of details 
processing accuracy that were observed by McDaniel, does not 
explain why a high number of individuals in the high time 
pressure group failed to complete the task. One possible 
explanation is that the task materials used here contained 
horizontal lines under each inventory item, thus making it 
easier to follow the data for a particular item across the 
page. McDaniel's result may have been more heavily influenced 
by decreases in visual acuity associated with increased time 
pressure. Given the cosmetic changes in the materials, it is 
possible that a higher level of pressure would have been 
necessary in order to observe decreases in the proficiency
26 Recall that while the actual amounts of time allotted 
for completion of the task was the same between studies, the 
tasks were different. McDaniel's study required the 
examination of more items within the tests of details. As a 
result the same time restriction was expected to create less 
time pressure in this study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
with which tests of details were executed. Whatever the 
explanation, the point remains that McDaniel's results 
indicate that there is a level of time pressure at which the 
proficiency of execution of audit tests of details will be 
affected. The results reported here indicate that this level 
of time pressure was not reached in this experiment, thus 
setting the stage for the analysis of whether the proposed 
subsidiary task of attending to red flags was affected.
Red Flag Detection Performance
The analysis now focuses on what was theorized to be the 
subsidiary task, that of attending to red flags. The first 
measurements to be considered are those associated with the 
documentation provided by the auditors in the experimental 
materials. The first measurement purported to capture any 
attention at all that may have been given to the two customers 
for whom the inventory records were likely to be misstated. 
Each of the experimental packets was evaluated as a whole and 
classified as either "detected" or "not detected" based on 
whether or not any notation was made that distinguished at 
least one of these customers from the others.
As the data from this classification is clearly nominal, 
a Chi-square test of independence may be appropriately applied 
for analysis. The assumption of normality that underlies the 
Chi-square test is dependent on the expected frequencies in 
each of the cells of the contingency table. In order to allow 
the discrete Chi-square test statistic to approximate the
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continuous Chi-square function, the expected frequency of each 
cell needs to be quite large. The generally accepted rule for 
the application of the Chi-square test is that it should not 
be employed when greater than 20% of the cells have expected 
frequencies of less than five [Siegel, 1956]. More 
conservative guidelines indicate that an expected frequency of 
five is the minimum acceptable frequency [Howell, 1982; 
Conover, 1971].
Panel A of Table 4 presents the data arranged in 
contingency table format. Because 50% of the cells had an
expected frequency of less than five, this statistic may not 
be appropriately applied. As a result, Fisher's exact 
probability test was used to analyze whether the two groups 
differ in the proportion with which they fall into the two 
classifications. The results of the Fisher's exact test (p < 
0.040) indicated that the two groups differ with respect to 
the probability that their members will be classified as 
"detected." The implication is that auditors under time 
pressure may be less likely to report the cues signalling 
possible misstatements. This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesized effect of time pressure and thus lends support to 
the theory predicting that, under arousal, attention will 
become more focused on primary-task-related activities at the 
expense of subsidiary-task activities. This result would 
appear to confirm the Treadway Commission's point regarding 
the pressures that may not be conducive to the recognition of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
indications of possible improprieties. Demographic
information for the auditors who were classified as "detected" 
under this measurement is presented alongside the other 
demographic information in Table 2.
This measurement of subsidiary task performance captured 
a very low level of recognition. That is, it measured whether 
the auditor recognized that the referenced items appeared 
unusual or different without taking into account whether or 
not the auditor understood that they were preliminary 
indications of impropriety. The measurement that takes into 
account the auditor's recognition of the referenced items as 
indicators of possible financial statement misstatements is 
discussed below.
The second measurement of subsidiary task performance 
required some understanding of the financial statement 
implications in order to achieve a "detected" classification. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the data arranged in contingency 
table format for this measurement. Again, Fisher's exact 
probability test was used to analyze differences between the 
groups. The results again indicated that the two groups are 
significantly different with respect to the probability that 
their members will be classified as "detected" (p £ 0.026). 
Alternatively stated, auditors under high time pressure were 
less likely to attend to and understand the implications of 
red flags than those under low time pressure. This finding is 
also supportive of the research hypothesis.
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Table 4
Contingency Tables: Red Flag Detection Performance
Panel A: Measurement One— Documented Anything Unusual
Time Pressure Level
Performance High Low
Not Detected 28 16 44
Detected 1 5 6
29 21 50
"Detected” = Documented anything unusual about either 
of the two "red flag” customers
Panel B: Measurement Two— Understood Misstatement
Time Pressure Level
Performance High Low
Not Detected 29 17 46
Detected 0 4 4
29 21 50
"Detected" = Documentation indicated that there may be 
a misstatement with regard to one or both 
of the "red flag" customers
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No statistical analysis was conducted on the third 
measurement of subsidiary task performance in the sequence 
because none of the auditors provided sufficient documentation 
to conclude that an understanding of the opportunities and 
incentives was integrated with the cues in the data. Reasons 
why this result was observed are presented in the discussion 
section. Table 5 summarizes the major hypotheses tested 
relative to the documentation provided on the red flag 
detection task, their a priori expectations, the results 
obtained, and the overall level of significance of Fisher's 
Exact tests. Taken as a whole, the results would tend to 
indicate that subjects under time pressure were less likely to 
provide documentation that either identified the "red flag" 
customers as being unusual in any way or identified the "red 
flag" customers as potentially misstated. In short, 
time pressure did appear to affect performance of the red flag 
detection task.
In addition to the output measures associated with the 
documentation provided by the auditors discussed above, 
questionnaires were issued during the experiment to elicit 
assessments of the likelihood of misstatement due to each of 
the error conditions in the data and the likelihood of fraud 
and irregularities. The following discussion details the 
analysis of the data provided on the questionnaires.
In order to determine whether the level of time pressure 
affected the detection of the consistent omissions from the
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Table 5
Hypotheses, Results, and Significance Levels 
for Red Flag Detection Performance
Research hypothesis Result p-value
H„i The high and low time pressure groups will differ with respect to 
the probability that their members 
will be classified as having noted 
anything unusual for the two "red 
flag" customers.
difference p<0.040
Hb2 The high and low time pressure groups will differ with respect to 
the probability that their members 
will be classified as having 
documented that there is a 
potential misstatement with regard 
to at least one of the "red flag" 
customers.
difference p=0.026
Hb3 The high and low time pressure groups will differ with respect to 
the probability that their members 
will be classified as having 
documented the incentives and 





reserve record for the two "red flag” customers, the average 
assessed likelihood of material misstatement due to omission 
from the reserve was compared across groups. Separate 
analyses were conducted on the averages computed from the 45 
minute questionnaires for all groups, the 55 minute 
questionnaires for the three groups who completed them,27 and 
the final questionnaire completed by each group.
27 Because those in the 45 minute time restriction 
condition were not asked to complete a 55 minute 
questionnaire, this group was omitted from the analysis.
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Additionally, the average difference between the assessed 
likelihood of material misstatement due to omission from the 
reserve and the average assessed likelihood of the other three 
sources of misstatements, were compared across groups. Again, 
separate analyses were conducted on the averages computed from 
the 45 minute questionnaires for all groups, the 55 minute 
questionnaires for the three groups who filled them out, and 
the final questionnaire filled out by each group. This 
analysis most directly parallels the second measurement based 
on auditor documentation— that of the number of auditors who 
noted that there may be a material misstatement relative to 
the two customers with excess units on hand. Because more 
factors can affect the questionnaire responses, the 
questionnaire is a less direct method of measuring attention 
to the indicators of a misstatement. If significant results 
were to be attained, however, it would reinforce any 
significant result obtained from the other metric. The 
following discussion details the analysis of the questionnaire 
items designed to approximate the third measurement based on 
auditor documentation— that of the number of auditors who 
integrated their understanding of the incentives and 
opportunities to commit irregularities into their 
documentation.
To determine whether time pressure affected the auditors' 
ability to recognize the misstatements as intentional, the 
average change in assessed likelihood of irregularities was
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compared across groups. The average change in assessed 
likelihood was calculated from the difference between the 
assessed likelihood of irregularities on the 15 minute 
questionnaire and the assessed likelihood on the later 
questionnaires. Again, separate analyses were conducted on 
the average changes computed from the difference between the 
15 minute and 45 minute questionnaires for all groups, the 15 
minute and 55 minute questionnaires for the three groups who 
filled them out, and the 15 minute and final questionnaire 
filled out by each group. The same analysis was conducted on 
the assessed likelihood of financial fraud.
None of the analyses related to the questionnaires issued 
during the experiment as discussed above provided significant 
results. Generally the differences were very small and in 
some cases in the opposite direction from what was expected. 
This failure to reject may have been due to several factors. 
One factor was that, according to the analysis of auditor 
documentation, only four of the auditors (all in the low time 
pressure condition) detected and understood the apparent 
financial statement implications of the items omitted from the 
reserve. In addition, several auditors who did not attend to 
the potential irregularity achieved results of audit tests 
indicating that the reserve was likely to be understated. The 
fact that auditors were instructed to select their own sample 
items from each page may have created a situation where their 
sample may have included several items that were improperly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
97
omitted from the reserve. In this situation, an assessment of 
a high likelihood of misstatement due to omission from the 
reserve would be appropriate. Such an assessment may have 
diluted any effect that the responses of those who attended to 
the potential irregularity might have had. In addition, even 
those who did attend to the indicators of potential 
irregularities appeared to be hesitant to label the situation 
as an irregularity or especially a financial fraud. This 
finding will be discussed further in the following section.
Discussion of Results 
Having presented the statistical analysis of the data, 
the focus now shifts to a discussion of these results and some 
of the procedures that were aimed at discovery rather than 
traditional hypothesis testing. A question could arise with 
regard to whether the detection and/or investigation of 
unusual items relative to the two potentially improperly 
reported customers was done concurrent with or subsequent to 
the execution of audit procedures. This consideration is 
important because the theoretical development discussed the 
effects of time pressure on the range of attention. 
Specifically, it was asserted that auditors under low time 
pressure were more likely to be attentive to a broad range of 
cues while executing tests of details than were those under 
high time pressure. The significant results that were 
obtained would not be attributable to the effects of time
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pressure on attention, however, if the indicators of potential 
fraud were attended to after completion of the test of details 
tasks. If, for example, an auditor in the low time pressure 
group who was classified as wdetectedN first executed all of 
the tests of details in 55 minutes and then went back and 
found an unusual item while browsing through the materials for 
the remaining 20 minutes, this result would have little 
bearing on the range of attention. It would be inappropriate 
to say that this auditor was more attentive to red flags while 
executing tests of details. It would simply mean that 
auditors with excess time on their hands may be more likely to 
uncover red flags. In audit practice, however, it is very 
rare that auditors will spend extra time on "completed" 
procedures as there is always another set of procedures 
waiting. If, on the other hand, the auditors under low time 
pressure were to provide documentation demonstrating that red 
flags were attended to during the execution of tests of 
details during the first 45 minutes, it would reinforce the 
conclusions drawn from the significant statistical results 
discussed earlier.
In order to monitor when the documentation of the 
potentially misstated customers occurred, the auditors were 
instructed to use regular graphite pencils for the first 45 
minutes and different colored pencils for each of the ten 
minute intervals thereafter (the pencils were provided to
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them),n The color of the documentation provided information 
on whether those who were classified as "detected" in the 
previously described process detected and investigated the 
items during the normal execution of audit procedures or 
whether they did so only after completing all audit steps. 
Alternatively stated, this measurement technique was used to 
assess whether the primary and subsidiary tasks were performed 
concurrently or sequentially.
In each of the six cases where an unusual item was 
identified, the auditor provided documentation indicating that 
it was detected within the first 45 minutes. This result may 
indicate that the significant difference obtained for this 
measurement was not simply due to the case where the auditors 
under low time pressure had more time to go hunting for 
problems at the end. Rather, it indicates that auditors under 
less time pressure may be attentive to a broader spectrum of 
cues that may be present in the data as they execute audit 
procedures. This result would be consistent with the 
theoretical development that predicted a narrowing of the 
range of attention under time pressure.
The analysis of the timing of documentation was also 
conducted on those who demonstrated an understanding of the 
red flags, that is, those who were classified as "detected"
28 All but two individuals complied with these 
instructions. Exit interviews and a review of their self- 
reported time provided information on when documentation was 
made.
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under the second measurement. In three of the four cases 
where an understanding of the potential financial statement 
misstatement was documented, the documentation was provided 
within the first 45 minutes.
Insight into the issue of perceived deficiencies in the 
area of attending to red flags may also be gained by 
considering possible explanations for why none of the auditors 
carried the investigation to the point where the incentives 
and opportunities for committing irregularities were 
considered in the analysis of the potential misstatements. 
This tendency to avoid such an analysis did not appear to be 
due to time pressure, as three of the four auditors who were 
classified as "detected" under the second measurement 
indicated that the time pressure during the experiment was 
quite low (all three responded that the time pressure was at 
"2" on a seven-point Likert scale with "1" representing "very 
little time pressure"). Furthermore, none of the four who 
self-reported the time spent on each audit procedure indicated 
that there was a shortage of time. In fact, their self- 
reports indicated that they finished three, six, eight, and 22 
minutes before time was called. The implication is that there 
would have been plenty of time for these individuals to relate 
the potential misstatement to the information in the task 
materials that referred to opportunities and incentives to 
commit irregularities.
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Possible explanations for their failure to take the 
analysis to a higher level are that the auditors did not 
consider such an effort to be within the scope of their 
responsibilities in the artificial experimental context or 
that they were simply impervious to the indications of 
incentives and opportunities for irregularities and did not 
understand the implications of the potential misstatement, or 
a combination of both. In order to analyze the possible 
reasons why a deeper level of analysis was not conducted, the 
documentation relevant to the potential misstatement is 
reproduced in Appendix F for each auditor who was classified 
as "detected" by either of the measurements. Appendix G 
provides an example of the type of analysis that integrates 
the contextual information on incentives and opportunities for 
irregularities into the documentation. It is presented as the 
"optimal" analysis in that it highlights the indicators of 
potential irregularities identified in SAS 53 [AICPA, 1992] 
that are present in the case and provides a recommended course 
of action.
From the documentation displayed in Appendix F, it 
appears that the auditors were either awaiting the opportunity 
to discuss the matter with supervisors or the client or 
deferring the matter until additional documents could be 
examined. Clearly there were not enough materials present in 
the audit task to make a final determination as to whether 
this hypothetical client was indeed involved in
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irregularities. It is possible that no such investigation was 
undertaken because they did not feel accountable for doing so 
in an artificial experimental context.29 It is concerning, 
however, that a deeper level of analysis was not undertaken 
given that (1) the task materials included several statements 
emphasizing that they were to follow up on procedures and 
document results just as they would in an actual audit 
situation, (2) they were instructed that the only way in which 
they could communicate their findings was through the 
documentation in the materials, and (3) all of the auditors 
appeared to have additional time to investigate more deeply 
any situation of concern to them.
There are two reasons why this result is of concern. 
First, without a deeper investigation and richer 
documentation, the situation may not be attended to by a 
reviewer of the working papers, especially in cases where the 
documentation also includes references to other, more trivial, 
types of errors. Because reviewers face pressures similar to 
those executing detailed audit procedures, a given stimulus 
(in this case documentation of the potential irregularity) 
needs to possess relatively strong psychophysical, collative, 
or ecological properties in order to draw attention. Second, 
when the auditor lacks an awareness of the incentives and 
opportunities for irregularities present in the client's
29 Earlier discussion detailed how the task of potential 
financial fraud detection may not be one for which auditors 
feel accountable in actual audit practice.
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environment, the auditor is less likely to execute the follow- 
up procedures with an appropriate degree of skepticism.
To illustrate, the recommendation given in Appendix G 
discusses the follow-up procedure of examining sales invoices 
and other records of sales activity for the fourth quarter of 
the fiscal year under audit and the subsequent first quarter. 
This procedure was most likely analogous to the procedure used 
at interim to audit average monthly usage figures over the 
first three quarters. Given the situation, however, it would 
most likely be inappropriate to conduct the follow-up 
procedures with the same level of skepticism as the tests at 
interim. Whereas the invoices examined at interim could have 
been scanned for the quantity, price and overall genuineness, 
the invoices examined in the follow-up procedure should be 
carefully scrutinized. In addition to verifying the prices 
and quantities, the auditor should carefully analyze the 
prenumbering sequence, to see if the invoices in question 
could have been produced on the asserted date. Signatures 
should be scrutinized more closely, and the documents should 
be checked for any indications of tampering. The auditor who 
is unaware that the likelihood of irregularities is relatively 
high, given the incentives and opportunities present, is less 
likely to exercise procedures with this appropriate level of 
skepticism.
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Summa-ry
Evidence reported here suggests that tine pressure may 
cause auditors' attention to become focused on cues related to 
test of details tasks at the expense of attention to red 
flags. This conclusion is based upon evidence that the 
proficiency with which auditors executed the test of details 
task (as measured by processing accuracy) did not suffer under 
time pressure but the proficiency with which they detected and 
investigated the red flags did decline. The fact that all of 
those who detected these indicators did so within the first 45 
minutes of the experimental task regardless of the time 
constraints that they were under lends support to the 
contention that those under less time pressure attended to a 
broader range of cues while executing the detailed tasks.
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CHAPTER 5
CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS,
AND EXTENSIONS OF RESEARCH
Overview
This study was conducted to investigate the effects of 
time pressure on auditors' attention to red flags in a dual­
task environment. It was predicted that under time pressure 
attention would become more focused on the primary task, 
(i.e., an auditing test of details type of task) at the 
expense of attention given to the subsidiary task (i.e., a 
task of attending to red flags). Several authoritative 
sources were cited that supported this conceptualization of 
primary and subsidiary tasks in the auditing environment. The 
theoretical development described the effects of time pressure 
as consisting of an element that causes the attentional field 
to be narrowed thus creating a situation where fewer cues are 
noticed at all, and an element that causes individuals to 
filter out stimuli that complicate the task at hand. The 
terms pre-attentive filtering mechanism and attentional coping 
mechanism, respectively, were advanced to describe these two 
effects. The Treadway Commission [1987, p. 25] implicitly 
referenced both of these effects when it indicated that 
independent accountants did not detect or investigate with 
skepticism items that may have indicated the presence of 
material misstatements and advanced time budget pressure as 
one possible cause of these behaviors.
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This research reported evidence consistent with the 
theory that predicted a decrease in the performance of the 
task of attending to red flags (secondary task) would occur 
while the accuracy with which the test of details task 
(primary task) would be performed would remain stable. This 
decrease in the performance of the red flag detection task was 
observed at two levels— the level at which anything at all 
unusual was attended to and documented and the level at which 
the unusual customers were linked to a potential misstatement 
of the financial statements. The nature of the documentation 
provided also permitted insight to be gained relative to the 
manner in which potential misstatements may be handled in 
audit situations.
Contributions
Several prominent researchers in the area of accounting 
have called for research investigating the context in which 
accounting takes place [Hogarth, 1991; Ashton et al., 1988; 
Dopuch, 1992; Lord, 1992]. This research has attempted to be 
responsive to this call by studying the contextual feature of 
time pressure in auditing. In addition to incorporating time 
pressure, this research also considered the dual nature of the 
auditor's role as a significant feature of the contextual 
environment. Support for the assertion that the task of 
attending to red flags takes place in a dual-task or multiple- 
task environment was provided by statements of the Public 
Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA,
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Treadway Commission, Auditing Standards Board, and surveys of 
practicing accountants. Drawing upon a well established line 
of research incorporating the dual-task paradigm in studying 
the effects of arousal on attention, this research attempted 
to predict the effects of time pressure on auditor attention 
to red flags in this experimental context.
Implications
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to reject the 
idea that time pressure can be effectively imposed to promote 
operational efficiency and effectiveness in the auditing 
environment. Clearly, a certain level of arousal is necessary 
in all tasks to reach the optimum level of performance. Time 
pressure can be a very effective method of inducing such 
arousal, especially for tasks that do not require that 
attention be given to the "big picture.” The Yerkes-Dodson 
Law states that the optimum level of arousal for complex tasks 
is lower than the optimum level of arousal for simple tasks. 
Based on this concept, an attempt should be made to tailor the 
level of arousal induced to the type of task being performed.
Accounting firms should be aware not only of the effects 
of time pressure on their employees, but also on entire firms 
as well. The level of litigation and the government attention 
being given to the profession may create a tendency to reduce 
the range of cues to which firms attend as well. They may 
become more concerned with "bottom line” type of 
considerations than they would under less stressful conditions
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[Weick, 1983]. The time budget, which often represents the
billable hours for the firm, is one factor that contributes
heavily to the "bottom line." Weick [1983, p. 359] indicates
that such a response is likely to occur:
As economic times get worse, there is a strong tendency 
to tighten controls. Budgets are cut, people are fired, 
products are dropped, amenities are canceled, and all of 
this is accompanied by much closer scrutiny of all 
operations that remain. This tightening of the control 
system both intensifies the stress any remaining person 
feels and also makes it harder to invent a response that 
can reverse the process.
The implication of this study is that excessive emphasis on
the time budget and the production of documentation associated
with tests of details can cause auditors to lose sight of
overall audit quality. Because of the relative infrequency of
red flags and the lack of a means of measuring attention to
them in a normal audit situation, there may be a tendency to
overemphasize the objective measurement provided by the time
budget in the performance of test of details types of tasks.
Such an emphasis can result in a subordination of the task of
giving attention to red flags to that of generating the
documentation required of audit tests of details.
Limitations
This research was concerned with the effect of time 
pressure on auditors' ability to detect red flags. This study 
did not attempt to provide evidence that would permit a 
general statement to be made on how well auditors execute this 
task. The only references made in regard to how well auditors 
execute this responsibility were reiterations of the public
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statements and pronouncements made by such groups as the Board 
of Directors of the AICPA, The Public Oversight Board, and the 
Treadway Commission. While care was taken to design the task 
to be analogous to an actual audit situation, it would be 
inappropriate to generalize the findings relative to this case 
too greatly.
This study reported evidence supporting the existence of 
a pre-attentive filtering mechanism, as there was a 
significant difference in the number of individuals indicating 
that they noticed anything at all unusual about the inventory 
records for the potentially misstated customers. The study 
could not make a strong case for the existence of an 
attentional coping mechanism. This arises from the fact that 
it could not be determined that time pressure plays a role in 
preventing those who detect unusual items from investigating 
them to the point where they can determine that there is a 
potential misstatement. The data provide little insight on 
this matter because only one auditor under high time pressure 
even detected anything unusual. That is, because only one 
auditor under time pressure noted any unusual items, it is 
difficult to say whether or not time pressure would cause 
auditors to forsake the deeper investigation of apparently 
unusual items in favor of completing test of details types of 
procedures. Although the theoretical development suggests the 
existence of an attentional coping mechanism and the Treadway
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Commission implicitly referenced such an effect, the evidence 
was insufficient to conclude that it exists.
These results do not imply that red flags will not be 
detected in audits where time pressure is high. This study 
did not permit auditors to use the decision aids, or tools and 
other procedures that might be highly effective. It was not 
possible to predict what type of mediating effect these tools 
may have. Also, this study did not incorporate the 
supervision and review dimensions of the auditing environment. 
These are two procedures that are explicitly required by 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards to ensure an acceptable 
level of audit quality. The documentation provided by the 
auditors indicated that they may have been awaiting 
instructions from a more senior auditor. The implications of 
this limitation were discussed fully in a previous section. 
An additional limitation arises from the fact that audits are 
normally conducted in an audit team situation. This 
experiment did not allow for any interaction between auditors 
and thus its generalizability may be limited.
Despite efforts to preserve the ecological validity of 
the task, it is possible that the auditors who participated in 
the experiment did not view the task as realistic, thus 
limiting the conclusions that can be drawn from this research. 
One way in which ecological validity may have been impaired is 
through the frequent administration of the experimental
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
questionnaires. These may have been disruptive in that they 
affected the continuity of work.
In addition to the concerns over the ecological validity 
of the experiment, there were several threats to its internal 
validity as well. Particularly, having to administer the 
experiment in several different settings introduced threats 
that may not have been present in a more controlled setting. 
Differences in the way in which the instructions were read, 
the time of the day, the questions asked and peer attitudes 
may have affected the results. Having members of different 
treatment groups in the same room may have confounded the 
manipulation of the independent variable, as those under low 
time pressure may have noted that others were completing the 
task before them.
Extensions
Many of the limitations discussed above may actually be 
an opportunity for extension of this study. As such, this 
study is seen as the first in a line of research that 
investigates factors influencing auditors' ability to detect 
red flags. The materials may be able to be revised so that a 
larger proportion of the auditors might detect something 
unusual for the two questionable customers. Such a result 
would allow the attentional coping mechanism to be more fully 
tested. Future administrations of the experiment may allow 
for the use of audit tools or collaboration in a group 
environment. Other opportunities for extension of this study
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arise from the nature of dual-task paradigm research into the 
effects of arousal on attention. Time pressure is just one of 
several possible arousing agents that could be analyzed within 
this paradigm. Future extensions could incorporate others of 
these individually and jointly with time pressure. Also, 
opportunities exist for refinement of the operationalization 
of the construct of time pressure. In keeping with past 
research into time pressure, this study operationalized the 
construct by restricting the allotted time. There may be 
other ways of inducing time pressure as well.
Conclusion
The Public Oversight Board, a group dedicated to the
preservation of the quality and integrity of the audit
process, has identified the issue of red flag detection as a
major concern facing profession. The following statement, in
the context of financial fraud, reflects the board's attitude
toward the issue:
The Board believes that, to a greater extent than it now
does, the profession must accept responsibility for the
detection on fraud by management. The profession cannot, 
and it cannot be expected to, develop methods that will 
assure that every fraud, no matter how cleverly 
contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the audit, 
but it must develop means of increasing significantly the 
likelihood of detecting fraud [Public Oversight Board of 
the SEC Practice Section, AICPA, 1993, p. 42].
By identifying one of the conditions that may be decreasing
the likelihood of attending to red flags and measuring its
effect, this study has provided the profession with
information that may assist in achieving the recommendations
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of the board. In doing so, this dissertation is responsive to 
each of the three goals of cognitive research in auditing 
identified by Hogarth [1991]— 1) to advance understanding of 
how auditors perform judgment and choice tasks; 2) to provide 
some measurement of how well they perform these tasks; and, 3) 
to suggest ways of improving performance. By examining 
performance on dual-tasks and explaining this behavior from a 
cognitive perspective, each of these objectives may be 
advanced.
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APPENDIX A
TOP-RATED SENIOR SUCCESS FACTORS 
AT A MAJOR ACCOUNTING FIRM
This table lists the top 19 out of 122 factors included on a survey of audit seniors who had been 
identified as successful by a major accounting firm. Survey respondents were asked to rate 122 factors 
that were identified as possibly contributing success as an auditor in the firm. All ratings were provided 
on a five point scale. The averages represent the average of the ratings supplied by all respondents. The 
factors considered to be closely related to the topic of this dissertation are shown in bold.
Skill in offering helpful and meaningful suggestions to coworkers/clients 4.7
Ability to work effectively under pressure (e.g., tight deadlines, etc.) 4.6
Ability to organize work and prioritize activities 4.6
Ability to adapt to considerable pressure from deadlines and heavy workload 4.5
Ability to handle several tasks at one time 4.5
Willingness to respond quickly and with a sense of urgency to meet client needs 4.5
Willingness and a flexibility to adjust to multiple demands, shifting priorities, ambiguity, 
and rapid change
4.4
Skill in managing own workload, and managing budgets/timetables to maximize 
engagement economics
4.4
Willingness to routinely work SO hours or more a week during certain time periods 4.4
Ability to work and get along with client representatives and other [Firm] team members 4.4
Ability to see the "big picture’ in addition to the details of a particular task 43
Willingness to persevere on assigned tasks in the face of obstacles or "roadblocks" 4.3
Ability to plan work for self and provide guidance to others on a short-term (i.e. daily) basis 4.3
Willingness to demonstrate a commitment to quality and continuous improvement in client 
service
4.3
Willingness to assume a leadership role on projects 4.3
Willingness to set high performance standards 4.3
Doing more than the minimum 43
Willingness to do things without being asked 43
Demonstrating a professional image/appearance/demeanor when working with clients 4.3
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APPENDIX B
DOCUMENTATION OF THE PRETESTING PROCESS
This appendix details the nature of each pretest conducted and the major changes made as a result. 
The minor changes and the rationale for each of the changes is omitted in the interest of presenting a more 
parsimonious account of the process.
Original Instrument:
McDaniel’s written materials were altered m inim ally . The only changes made were to expand the 
auditors’ responsibilities to include the detection of irregularities rather than just errors. The audit program 
related the documentation requirements more explicitly than McDaniel’s did. The data was altered 
significantly to include the misstatements of the reserve record. Initially, all of the customers were of equal 
size and ten customers contained consistent omissions of overstocked inventory from the reserve (rather 
than the two that were ultimately reported erroneously).
Pretest # 1:
Subjects: Ten senior-level or graduate students divided into high and low time pressure conditions. 
Results:
*  None of the students noted the consistent reserve item omissions for any of the ten customers.
*  Several noted that the reserve was understated, but that was just due to the excessive number of 
exceptions included in the sample (i.e., they sampled one item from many of the customers with 
consistent omissions but did not notice systematic nature of the other omissions outside of the 
sample).
*  The debriefing process revealed that students were confused by the policy for valuing the reserve. 
Alterations of the Instrument:
*  The Inventory Reserve Record was renamed the Reserve for Slow-Moving and Overstocked
Inventory Record. The policy for valuing the reserve was clarified to reflect the effects of an 
omission on inventory and net income.
Pretest #s 2a and 2b:
Subjects: Four and three auditors, respectively, in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
*  The auditors’ performance was essentially the same as the students in pretest # 1 (on the 
subsidiary task).
*  Several of these auditors suggested that the policy for valuing the reserve may be overly
restrictive; they believed that there was probably a legitimate reason for the omission of items 
from the reserve that was noted in their samples. Discussions with these auditors revealed that 
they believed that, by documenting that the sample indicated a material misstatement due to 
reserve item omissions, they did not see the need to investigate the area further.
*  They also indicated that the omission of items from the finished goods inventory was confusing
and that they could generate no reasonable explanation for these items.
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Alterations of the Instrument:
*  Based on discussions with these auditors and meetings with two audit partners, statements were 
added that:
* discussed environmental factors (e.g., increased competition, slower inventory turnover, 
etc.),
*  established the policy for valuing the reserve as an industry standard, and
*  increased the strength of the wording of the statements emphasizing the dual nature of 
the auditor’s task.
*  The number of customers for whom all items were overstocked but omitted from the reserve was 
reduced from ten to two. The distribution of customer sizes was changed from a uniform 
distribution to one in which there were 35 small customers, 20 medium sized customers, and five 
very large customers. The two "red flag* customers were very large customers. This had the 
effect of making it relatively unlikely that the samples chosen to execute the detailed tests would 
reveal an excessive number of omissions.
*  The number of finished goods omission items was reduced from 8% to 1%. This lowered the 
required sample size of the inventory test count and eliminated the ’dead end” investigation of the 
omissions that were not realistic types of errors and therefore had no plausible explanation. The 
reduced sample size for this step allowed ten minutes to be trimmed from the time pressure 
conditions.
*  Customer totals were added for the average monthly use and units on hand. This was done to 
increase the strength of the psychophysical and collative properties of the cues indicative of 
possible irregularities present.
Pretest # 3:
Subjects: Seven auditors in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
♦One auditor detected and documented the situation involving one of the two ’ red flag* customers. It 
appeared that this auditor first completed the assigned procedures and then went back and looked for other 
things to do. The others did not make any documentation of the situation (although a discussion revealed 
that one other auditor saw something unusual but did not pursue it).
* The changes designed to eliminate the consideration of finished goods inventory omissions and the 
questioning of the policy for valuing the reserve appeared to be successful.
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Alterations of the Instrument:
*  Customer inventory turnover ratios were added to the finished goods inventory record. No 
mention of the ratio was made anywhere else on the audit program or in other experimental 
materials in order to avoid indicating that audit procedures needed to be executed on these ratios.
* The audit program was altered to emphasize the importance of reviewing for items that appear 
unusual during the execution of detailed audit procedures.
*  The way time pressure was communicated was changed by assigning budgeted times for 
each audit step. This had the effect of making it clearer earlier whether or not the task 
would be completed on time; thus allowing those under low time pressure to operate 
under lower arousal earlier. The pretest auditors appeared to be intense during the 
execution of procedures and very relaxed in the period after procedures were completed. 
They were pressing on throughout because they did not know how long the next 
procedure was going to take.
* The importance of reviewing for unusual items while executing the audit program steps 
was emphasized on the audit program. The wording of this statement was consistent with 
audit programs used in professional practice.
*  The dual nature of the auditors role was reemphasized in the audit program instructions.
* During experimental questionnaires were developed to be used to measure concurrent processing 
of the indicators of financial fraud.
Pretest # 4:
Subjects: Two faculty members one under low time pressure and one under undefined time pressure (no
time limit was set for this subject but it was apparent that the task was completed very quickly).
Results:
*  Neither detected the red flags in the data, but one noted several of the indicators present in the 
environment.
* Discussions revealed that the inventory turnover ratio (which was abbreviated ITO in the records
without any legend indicating what ITO stood for) was not clearly understood.
Alterations of the Instrument:
*  The customer subtotals (including ITO) were place in bold type to strengthen the psychophysical 
properties associated with these cues.
* The language of the red flags in the contextual information was strengthened.
Pretest # 5:
Subject: One auditor in the low time pressure condition.
Results:
*  This auditor noted the low ITO ratios, circled them, and wrote ’ investigate’ next to them but did 
not perform any follow-up investigation.
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Alterations to the Instrument:
*  The importance of following-up on any unusual items, customers, products, or amounts was 
emphasized in the task instructions and the audit program.
*  An explanation of the ITO was placed on the front page of the inventory records as a note made 
by another auditor. The ITO was linked directly to the column headings on the records. It was 
emphasized that low levels of the ITO ratio were indicative of a build up of units on hand relative 
to the average monthly usage. This change was made to strengthen the ecological properties of 
the ITO cues.
*  Many passages in the written materials were evaluated and adjusted where it was necessary to 
clarify ambiguous statements.
Pretest ffs 6a and 6b:
Subjects: Four and two auditors, respectively, all in the low time pressure condition except one auditor
in 6a in the high time pressure condition.
Results:
*  Three of the five in the low time pressure condition made some indication that there was 
something unusual with the 'red flag* customers. One of these thoroughly documented the 
situation linking it to the increased competition.
*  The auditor under high time pressure did nothing other than execute the assigned audit procedures 
and made no extra marks on the materials.
Alteration to the Instrument:
* Some additional questions were added to the post-experimental questionnaire.
Pretest if 7:
Subjects: Eight graduate students in an advanced auditing class. Six were under low time pressure and
two were under undefined time pressure (although they appeared to rush through it).
Results:
*  Three of the students (all under low time pressure) thoroughly documented the situation involving 
the 'red flag’ customers.
Alteration of the Instrument:
* The description of an additional incentive and opportunity to engage in irregularities was added 
to the task instructions.
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APPENDIX C
TEST INSTRUM ENT 
TASK INSTRUCTIONS
Task Requirements
You are assisting in the current year’s inventory work for the University Division of CEA 
Co., a large, highly diversified manufacturer who has been audited by your firm for the last four years. 
Because of the diversity between the divisions of CEA Co., each has a high degree of autonomy. 
Corporate influence comes mainly in the form of financial statement based incentives and resource 
allocations. The Division supplies CEA's 60 university customers with 25 different products (e.g., 
sweatshirts running shorts, caps, etc.) that include the individual schools’ logos. You have been 
assigned to complete a portion of the Division’s audit of Finished Goods Inventory and the related 
Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory. You are to examine the client-prepared records for 
certain bookkeeping errors and irregularities and to document your findings within the time allotted.
Any potential errors or irregularities are related to inventory and reserve valuation and 
completeness. You have a dual role to play in this task just as you do in actual audit situations. You 
have the responsibility to achieve the audit objectives by
*  executing assigned audit procedures as effectively and efficiently as possible and
*  being attentive to any indicators of possible irregularities that may be present in the 
data.
Your responsibility for following up on these procedures and documenting the results of these 
procedures is the same as it would be in an actual audit situation.
Client and Audit Information
All information needed to conduct your examination is provided either by the client or your 
firm’s engagement office. Just as in a normal audit situation, you should study and obtain an 
understanding of all information prior to executing the audit procedures. Time has been allocated for 
this task in the audit program. You will have the following information:
I. CEA Co. University Division Records (prepared by client):
(A) year-end Finished Goods Inventory Record as of 3-31-93 (arranged by customer with average
monthly use, units on hand, and unit cost information for each product code; also reported are 
inventory turnover ratios for each customer—labelled ITO on record—and subtotals for each 
customer of average monthly usage and units on hand—labelled TOTAL)
(B) year-end Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory Record as of 3-31-93.
(C) catalog list of approved product codes with their current costs. (Different logos do not vary in
cost. Therefore, items with the same product code but different university logos should have 
the same unit cost.)
(D) client statement of CEA’s policy for valuing the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete 
Inventory (with auditors’ notes on the policy below).
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II. Audit Materials (prepared by engagement office):
(A) excerpts from the engagement office’s letter about the University Division:
(1) statement of audit objectives,
(2) description of the client’s operating environment,
(3) expected population error rates (by type) based on sample error rates observed by
your firm over the past four years.
(B) details of work performed (or to be performed) at the Division by other auditors in your firm
(you may rely on this work in your examination):
(1) year-end inventory test counts,
(2) audited average monthly usage values (These values are based upon net sales of each
item over the first three quarters of the fiscal year. The audit of these values was 
conducted during interim testing procedures.)
(3) extensions and footings of the inventory and reserve records (to be performed by other 
auditors after your examination). Note: the totals of the records listed in I., above, 
have been traced to the general ledger (the totals are not provided, however).
(C) an audit program designed to assist your examination for errors.
Documentation Requirements
In order to accurately evaluate the results of your efforts, it is important to document your 
work. Blank columns are provided in the various inventory records to show your work. The audit 
program will instruct you as to the column in which you should show your work for each particular 
audit procedure. For each characteristic of the inventory or reserve item selected for examination,
(1) circle the item’s characteristic being tested (e.g., circle the selected item’s unit cost),
(2) indicate the accuracy of the characteristic by marking in the labeled column a check 
mark (if the characteristic is correct) or an X (if the characteristic is in error).
Additional space is provided on the right-hand side of each page of the client-prepared 
materials for you to document any work done in addition to that required by the audit program or to 
document any other situation which you may feel requires further attention. An additional page is also 
provided for you to provide more detailed documentation.
Importance of Your Work
Your ability to accurately identify any errors or irregularities in the client's inventory records 
is of interest to your supervisors. It is important to work to achieve the stated objectives as accurately 
and efficiently as possible.
Questions
Please take a few minutes to review these instructions. If  you have any questions, ask them 
before we begin the inventory exercise. Once your time begins, no questions can be answered. Your 
time will begin when you are instructed to open the inventory materials.
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STATEMENT OF AUDIT OBJECTIVES 
For the portion of the inventory audit that you are performing, you have the following two 
objectives:
*  To be 90% confident that the true error rate for each error type below does not 
exceed the tolerable error rate of 15%. The audit procedures detailed in the audit 
program have been designed to allow you to achieve this objective.
*  To reach an overall conclusion as to the reasonableness and the fairness of the items 
and amounts presented and disclosed in the financial statements. Your review for 
items, amounts, products, and customers that appear unusual (which is to be executed 
concurrently with the audit program steps) should allow you to achieve this objective.
To obtain these objectives, you should execute your audit procedures as effectively and efficiently as 
possible while being attentive to the possibility that errors or irregularities may exist in the data.
CLIENT’S OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
(excerpt from audit planning memo)
The fourth quarter entry of a new, major competitor in the market has affected the demand for 
the products of the University Division of CEA Co.. This may have the effect of making it more 
difficult to retain existing customers. Our preliminary review of year-end financial information has 
indicated that profitability is down and inventory is up. Analytical procedures revealed that aggregate 
inventory turnover (ITO) is lower, meaning that the client has had to hold onto its inventory longer.
As a result, the number of units on hand is greater relative to the average monthly usage than it has 
been in the past. At this time, it is unclear as to whether this situation is a result of an overall slow­
down or a situation involving specific items, products, or customers. We should be attentive to any 
detailed data that might provide information on this situation. The inventory area has been identified as 
more risky this year than in prior years.
EXPECTED POPULATION ERROR RATES
Over the past four years a number of bookkeeping errors have been detected in this portion of 
the year-end audit of inventory and associated reserve for overstocked and slow-moving items for this 
CEA Co. Division. All errors relate to valuation and completeness. The table below summarizes the 
expected population error rates for the current year's audit based on sample results of the past four 
years’ observed frequencies for these types of inventory errors. The samples in the audit program are 
designed to achieve the required level of confidence given these expected population error rates.
Expected Population
Assertion Type of Error Error Rate
Valuation Finished Goods Inventory
unit pricing 9%
Reserve for Slow-moving and
Obsolete Inventory unit pricing S %
Completeness Finished Goods Inventory
item omission 1 %
Reserve for Slow-moving and
Obsolete Inventory item omission 3 %
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INVENTORY AUDIT PROGRAM INSTRUCTIONS
You should use this program to assist in your examination for errors and irregularities in the 
client’s Finished Goods Inventory and Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory 
Records
While the procedures in this program are designed to provide the appropriate level of 
confidence that the true population error rate for each error type does not exceed the tolerable 
error rate, you should be attentive to any errors or irregularities that may exist but may not 
show up in the sample.
* Execute the audit procedure of ’ reviewing the records for items, amounts, products, 
and customers that appear unusual* as you perform each audit program step.
*  Just as it would be in an actual audit situation, execution of the audit program steps 
without being attentive to unusual items would be inappropriate.
Use a ’haphazard” sample selection technique to pick the individual items to be investigated.
For the sampled items, you should be concerned with the frequency and nature of any errors, 
rather than direction or monetary effect. You should consider all aspects of any unusual items 
noted in your review, however.
Your responsibility for following up on these procedures and documenting the results of these 
procedures is the same as it would be in an actual audit situation, given the constraints on the 
information available. Please attempt to conduct all follow-up procedures and provide 
documentation as you complete each step.
Performance of the audit procedures within the times noted in the ’Time Bud.’ column next to 
each audit step will allow you to complete the task within the total time allotted for the audit 
task.
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INVENTORY AUDIT PROGRAM
Concurrent with all audit 
program steps.
Review records for items, amounts, products, and customers that appear 
unusual. Your initial on any of the other audit program steps indicates that 






13 Study and obtain an understanding of all client information, records, and audit 
program steps.
14
Using the test count sheet from the physical inventory observation procedures 
(previously performed by your firm’s auditors), trace each item physically 
counted to the units on hand reported in the Finished Goods Inventory.
(Documentation: Circle units on hand. Place a check or an "X" in the 
column labelled "FINISHED GOODS OMISSION.")
13
From each page of the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory, 
select a sample of five items. For each sample item, verify that the per unit 
cost agrees with the approved product code-current cost list.
(Documentation: Circle unit cost. Place a check or an "X" in the column 
labelled "RESERVE PRICING.")
17
From the Finished Goods Inventory, select one item from 25 of the 30 pages. 
For each sample item, calculate whether the quantity on hand exceeds 3 times 
the monthly usage. Any items having in excess of three month’s usage should 
be traced to the Reserve to verifv that the excess units are properlv included.
(Documentation: Circle the average monthly usage for each item selected. 
Place a check or an "X" in the column labelled "RESERVE ITEM  
OMISSION." Place an "X" only if
UNITS ON HAND >  3 *  AVG MONTHLY USE 
AND the item is not included on the reserve)
18
From the Finished Goods Inventory, select three items from each odd- 
numbered page and two items from each even-numbered page. For each 
sample item, verify that the recorded per unit cost agrees with the approved 
product code-current cost list.
(Documentation: Circle unit cost. Place a check or an "X" in the column 
labelled "FINISHED GOODS PRICING.")
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POLICY FOR VALUING THE RESERVE FOR 
SLOW-MOVING AND OBSOLETE INVENTORY 
In order to show its inventory at the lower of cost or market, CEA Co. determines the value 
of its year-end inventory at each division by reducing the total book value of Finished Goods Inventory 
by the total Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory value. An entry is recorded in the 
Reserve for any finished goods inventory item whose quantity on hand exceeds 3 times its average 
monthly usage. The EXCESS quantity (i.e., supply greater than 3 months usage) is to be recorded on 
the Reserve for Slow-moving and Obsolete Inventory at the current unit cost.
(For example: Suppose a particular item in the Finished Goods Inventory reports 90 units on hand with 
an average monthly usage of 25 units and a current cost of $2 per unit. The Reserve for Slow-moving 
and Obsolete Inventory should include a corresponding entry for EXCESS quantity of 15 units [90 - (25 
x 3)] at the item’s $2 unit cost.)
Auditor’s Notes on Client Policy 
The following entry should be made in the inventory records to establish the reserve for the above 
example:
Holding Loss 30 <  =  =  Income Statement
Reserve for Slow-moving &  Obsolete 
Inventory (logo num, prod code) 30 <  =  =Contra-asset
Similar entries should be made for all other items whose quantity on hand exceeds three times the 
average monthly usage. The division’s chief financial officer initiates and authorizes the recording of 
these entries based upon a review of inventory records. The reserve record displays all of the items for 
which such an entry was made at year-end.
This method of valuing inventory is very well established and accepted in the industry. All of CEA 
Co.’s major competitors use this method of establishing the reserve for slow-moving and obsolete 
items. Deviations from this policy would affect the comparability of CEA Co.’s financial statements to 
those of its competitors.
APPROVED PRODUCT CODES AND UNIT COSTS LIST (as of 3/31/93)
(Prepared by Client) (Verified by Auditors)
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MCDANIEL'S AND THE 
DISSERTATION'S TEST INSTRUMENTS
Area of change McDaniel’s study Dissertation
Auditor
Responsibility
Auditors were required 
to execute the test of 
details task. With no 
interpretation of results.
Auditors were required to be attentive to any unusual 
items requiring additional investigation while 
executing the audit test of details task. They were 
informed that their responsibility to follow up on the 
procedures and document the results of the 
procedures was the same as it would be in a normal 
audit situation.
Red Flags None. The errors 
seeded in this task were 
random pricing 
transposition errors, 
random omissions from 
the reserve, and random 
omission from the 
finished goods inventory 
records.
Indicators consisted of environmental or contextual 
factors and task data factors. The following 
environmental or contextual factors were present: 1) 
the inventory turnover ratio for the division was 
lower than in previous years, 2) the total inventory 
was quite high, 3) division profitability was low, 4) 
competition for the division’s customers was 
increasing, 5) the division may have difficulty in 
retaining customers, 6) the overall riskiness of the 
inventory area was assessed to be quite high, 7) 
there was centralized authority w ithin  the division, 
and 8) the division was an autonomous unit in a 
highly diversified company which distributed 
resources and incentives based on financial 
statements.
The task data indicators consisted of frequent and 
systematic omissions from the reserve for the two 
largest customers of the division. The task data was 
also altered by reducing the number of omissions 
from the finished goods record to reduce confusion 
about apparently unexplainable errors.
Client policies 
and procedures
Explained policy for 
establishing the reserve 
inventory.
The title of the inventory reserve listing was changed 
to ’ Reserve for Slow Moving and Obsolete 
Inventory* to be more descriptive. The policy for 
establishing an item on the reserve was more clearly 
explained to allow auditors to realize the financial 
statement effects of omissions from the reserve. The 
policy was described as being well established within 
the industry and vital for the comparability of 
financial statements.
1 3 1
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APPENDIX E
SAMPLE EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Based on the data you have reviewed and your auditing judgment, what is the likelihood that:
a) there is a material misstatement involving the omission of items from the Finished Goods 
Inventory Record?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remotely very
likely likely
Have not begun investigation of this area_____
b) there is a material misstatement involving the omission of items from the Reserve for Slow- 
moving and Obsolete Inventory Record
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remotely very
likely likely
Have not begun investigation of this area_____
c) there is a material misstatement involving the pricing of the units in the Reserve for Slow- 
moving and Obsolete Inventory Record
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remotely very
likely likely
Have not begun investigation of this area_____
d) there is a material misstatement involving the pricing of the units in Finished Goods Inventory
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remotely very
likely likely
Have not begun investigation of this area_____
e) there are irregularities (intentional misstatements) present in the data
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
remotely very
likely likely
f) financial reporting fraud (intentionally misleading financial statements) is present
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APPENDIX F
PARTICIPANT AUDITOR DOCUMENTATION OF 
THE RED FLAGS
Subject # OS:
Time Allotted: 65 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 41 minutes 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Wrote ’Obsolete?* next to the low inventory turnover ratio for one of the two 
potentially misstated customers.
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Not Detected 
Subject # 56:
Time Allotted: 55 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 46 minutes 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected
Circled the inventory turnover ratio and wrote ’ Very low! * next to it for both of the 
two potentially misstated customers.
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Not Detected
1 33
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Subject # 58:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 57 minutes 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected 
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
On the Additional Documentation page this auditor wrote, ’ Inventory turnover rate for Univ. logo #s 
108 and 148 are low in relation to other customers. Possible obsolescence issue in addition to amounts 
already recorded.’
In the Post Experimental Questionnaire, this auditor identified the low inventory turnover ratios for the 
two customers and indicated that there should be an independent calculation of the reserve amount.
Subject # 62:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 72 minutes 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected 
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
On the Finished Goods Inventory Record next to customer number 148 this auditor wrote, ’Additional 
testing done on LOGO 148 due to large quantities on hand.’ Several calculations were included next to 
this customer indicating that this auditor had generated an estimate of the amount of the misstatement of 
the reserve. These calculations indicated that there was a 32,236 unit excess resulting in a possible 
$219,746 adjustment of the reserve.
These calculations were elaborated upon on the Additional Documentation page in which the comment 
was made, ’ It looks as if  several items in LOGO 148 &  108 have been left off of the reserve listing 
(see low ITOs). Approximate misstatement =  $200,000 in logo 148. We should have client compute 
actual amount of misstatement and propose adjusting JE to correct. Number of errors indicates results 
will exceed tolerable error rate of 15%.
The audit program indicated that this auditor spent over 45 % of the total time on the reserve item 
omission step. An exit interview confirmed that the analysis of the reserve item omission was done 
during the execution of the audit step which led to the discovery.
The two customers were identified again in the Post Experimental Questionnaire.
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Subject # 22:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 53 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected 
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
Next to both of the potentially misstated customers, this subject wrote, "Most of these items require a 
reserve."
On the Additional Documentation page this subject wrote, "Did a review of average monthly usage and 
total units on hand. Noted logo numbers 112 and 117 are over reserved and very few of these appear 
on the slow moving and obsolete sheet Thus, reserve may be misstated." This was the only note 
appearing on this page.
The initial detection of the items appeared to occur during the execution of the audit steps. The 
additional documentation was done during the last ten minutes of the task (as indicated by writing 
utensil color).
Subject # 26:
Time Allotted: 75 minutes 
Reported Time Taken: 69 
Detection Performance:
First measurement (notice anything unusual): Detected 
Second measurement (understand misstatement): Detected
For one of the two potentially misstated customers, the "Reserve Item Omission’ column contained Xs 
nest to each of the items improperly excluded from the reserve. In the comments area next to this 
customer was the comment "Not on reserve listing" for each item with an X. The writing utensil color 
indicated that this analysis was done concurrent with the execution of the audit program step.
On the Additional Documentation page were the following comments:
"It is questionable whether we can rely on the clients FG inventory listing for amt. extensions as there 
are numerous occasions where the improper unit cost was used. Also we need to follow up on why our 
test count was diff. that the listing—may indicate that we can’t rely on the listing at all."
"The reserve calculation for slow/obsolete will need to be redone. First, some items are 
inappropriately excluded. Second, amts (per unit cost) are incorrect Third, FG listing is suspect (see 
above)."
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APPENDIX G
O PTIM A L DOCUMENTATION OF THE RED FLAGS
"O p tim al*  Documentation
There appears to be a material misstatement with regard to the completeness assertion for the 
Reserve for Slow-Moving and Obsolete Inventory. Based on the audit procedures applied thus far, the 
misstatement appears to be intentional and quite possibly an instance of financial fraud. The support 
for these conclusions is outlined below.
The units on hand for all products for the customers numbered 108 and 148 are in excess of 
three times the average monthly usage. Only an average number of products for these two customers 
are reported on the inventory reserve listing (approximately five for each customer out of 25 that 
should be on the reserve). Given the explicit language about the policy for valuing the reserve (that 
deviations from the policy of including on the reserve all items with an excess of three times the 
average monthly usage would affect comparability of the financial statements), the financial statements 
are, at a m in im u m , materially misstated.
It should be noted that it is possible that large sales occurring just prior to year-end may have 
gone unrecorded, thus reducing the likelihood that the misstatement is due to irregularity. The follow- 
up investigation should include procedures to determine whether that is the case. Because of the 
significance of such a transaction, should it be proposed to exist, the auditors should be highly skeptical 
of any evidence provided and should take special care to ensure that the timing of the reduction on the 
inventory coincided with the recognition of the sale. The following discussion details why it is more 
likely that the misstatement is a result of financial fraud rather than a failure to record large sales.
First, it is clear that the following incentives to commit financial fraud are present in the 
environment:
*  The University Division is operating under corporate financial statement based incentives and 
resource allocations.
* Competition is increasing with the fourth quarter entry of a new, major competitor.
* The new competition may make it difficult to retain existing customers.
*  Profitability is down. Note that this is especially relevant given that incentives and resource 
allocations are based on the financial statements.
The following are opportunities to commit financial fraud:
*  The University Division is fairly autonomous.
*  The diversity of the corporation may make it difficult to closely monitor the Division.
*  The Division’s CFO initiates and authorizes the recording of items on the inventory reserve 
record. It seems unusual that a task which should be routine is given to such a high ranking 
official who is most likely not subject to review.
1 3 6
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The following points highlight some of the reasons why the potential financial fraud may have
perpetrated:
*  The failure to make the entry to record items on the reserve has the effect of overstating net 
income and total assets, two factors which are probable bases for financial statement based 
incentives.
* The two customers in question are two of the company’s five largest customers.
*  The fact that the number of units on hand is in excess of three times the average monthly
usage for all products may indicate that the client is not selling to these two customers. That 
is, they may have lost these customers. The size and timing of the overstatements indicate that 
the loss of these customers may have occurred in the fourth quarter.
*  The average monthly usage values were audited during interim testing procedures based on
sales over the first three quarters of the fiscal year. These procedures would not be sensitive 
to the loss of customers occurring during the fourth quarter.
*  The sizes of the two potentially lost customers may make it difficult for the Division to stay in
business. Leaving the excesses off of the reserve may have been an attempt to conceal a 
potential going concern problem from the auditors and others.
Recommendation:
It is recommended that for the customers in question (and possibly the other three large 
customers) an extensive review of fourth quarter sales for the year under audit and first quarter sales 
for the subsequent year should be undertaken. This review should incorporate the analysis of sales 
invoices and cash receipts with a very high level of skepticism to determine if  goods are currently being 
sold to these customers. If  the client can produce apparently appropriate documents for these 
customers, independent confirmation with the customer of the representations included therein should 
be considered. If  these audit procedures lead to the conclusion that these customers have been lost and 
that the goods are obsolete, the matter should be communicated to the audit committee as a likely 
financial fraud. In light of the new information on the integrity of management, the scope of the entire 
audit should be reevaluated with special attention given to evidence obtained through inquiry of top 
management.
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